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Abstract
Model-based reinforcement learning (RL), which finds an optimal policy using an empiri-
cal model, has long been recognized as one of the corner stones of RL. It is especially suitable
for multi-agent RL (MARL), as it naturally decouples the learning and the planning phases, and
avoids the non-stationarity problem when all agents are improving their policies simultaneously
using samples. Though intuitive, easy-to-implement, and widely-used, the sample complexity of
model-based MARL algorithms has not been fully investigated. In this paper, our goal is to ad-
dress the fundamental question about its sample complexity. We study arguably the most basic
MARL setting: two-player discounted zero-sum Markov games, given only access to a generative
model. We show that model-based MARL achieves a sample complexity of O˜(|S||A||B|(1−γ)−3−2)
for finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) value up to some  error, and the -NE policies with a
smooth planning oracle, where γ is the discount factor, and S ,A,B denote the state space, and the
action spaces for the two agents. We further show that such a sample bound is minimax-optimal
(up to logarithmic factors) if the algorithm is reward-agnostic, where the algorithm queries state
transition samples without reward knowledge, by establishing a matching lower bound. This is
in contrast to the usual reward-aware setting, in which the sample complexity is lower bounded
by Ω˜(|S|(|A| + |B|)(1 − γ)−3−2), and this model-based approach is near-optimal with only a gap
on the |A|, |B| dependence. Our results not only demonstrate the sample-efficiency of this ba-
sic model-based approach in MARL, but also elaborate on the fundamental tradeoff between its
power (easily handling the more challenging reward-agnostic case) and limitation (less adaptive
and suboptimal in |A|, |B|), which particularly arises in the multi-agent context.
1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed numerous successes of reinforcement learning (RL) in many applica-
tions, e.g., playing strategy games (OpenAI, 2018; Vinyals et al., 2019), playing the game of Go
(Silver et al., 2016, 2017), autonomous driving (Shalev-Shwartz et al., 2016), and security (Nguyen
and Reddi, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019c). Most of these successful while practical applications involve
more than one decision-maker, giving birth to the surging interests and efforts in studying multi-
agent RL (MARL) recently, especially on the theoretical side (Wei et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2018a;
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Sidford et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019a; Xie et al., 2020; Shah et al., 2020; Bai and Jin, 2020; Bai
et al., 2020). See also comprehensive surveys on MARL in (Busoniu et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2019b;
Nguyen et al., 2020).
In general MARL, all agents affect both the state transition and the rewards of each other, while
each agent may possess different, sometimes even totally conflicting objectives. Without knowledge
of the model, the agents have to resort to data to either estimate the model, improve their own
policy, and/or infer other agents’ policies. One fundamental challenge in MARL is the emergence
of non-stationarity during the learning process (Busoniu et al., 2008; Zhang et al., 2019b): when
multiple agents improve their policies concurrently and directly using samples, the environment
becomes non-stationary from each agent’s perspective. This has posed great challenge to develop-
ment of effective MARL algorithms based on single-agent ones, especially model-free ones, as the
condition for guaranteeing convergence in the latter fails to hold in MARL. One tempting remedy is
the simple while intuitive method — model-based MARL: one first estimates an empirical model us-
ing data, and then finds the optimal, more specifically, equilibrium policies in this empirical model,
via planning. Model-based MARL naturally decouples the learning and planning phases, and can be
incorporated with any black-box planning algorithm that is efficient, e.g., value iteration (Shapley,
1953) and (generalized) policy iteration (Patek, 1997; Pe´rolat et al., 2015). More importantly, after
estimating the model, this approach can potentially handle more than one MARL tasks with differ-
ent reward functions but a common transition model, without re-sampling the data. Being able to
handle this reward-agnostic case greatly expands the power of such a model-based approach.
Though widely-used and easy-to-implement, rigorous theoretical justifications for these model-
based MARL methods are relatively rare. In this work, our goal is to answer the following standing
question: how good is the performance of this naı¨ve “plug-in” method in terms of non-asymptotic
sample complexity? To this end, we focus on arguably the most basic MARL setting ever since
Littman (1994): two-player discounted zero-sum Markov games (MGs) with simultaneous-move
agents, given only access to a generative model. This generative model allows agents to sample
the MG, and query the next state from the transition process, given any state-action pair as input.
The generative model setting has been a benchmark in RL when studying the sample efficiency of
algorithms (Kearns and Singh, 1999; Kakade, 2003; Azar et al., 2013; Sidford et al., 2018; Agarwal
et al., 2019a). Indeed, this model allows for the study of sample-based multi-agent planning over a
long horizon, and helps develop better understanding of the statistical properties of the algorithms,
decoupled from the exploration complexity.
Motivated by recent minimax optimal complexity results for single-agent model-based RL (Agar-
wal et al., 2019a), we address the question above with a positive answer: the model-based MARL
approach can achieve near-minimax optimal sample complexity — in terms of dependencies on the
size of the state space, the horizon, and the desired accuracy — for finding both the Nash equilibrium
(NE) value and the NE policies. We also provide a separation in the achievable sample complexity,
unique to the multi-agent setting, where, with regards to the dependencies on the number of actions,
the naive model based approach is sub-optimal. A detailed description is provided next.
Contribution. We establish the sample complexities of model-based MARL in zero-sum discounted
Markov games, when a generative model is available. First, observing that the sampling process in
this setting is agnostic to the reward function, we distinguish between two algorithmic frameworks:
reward-aware and reward-agnostic cases, depending on whether the reward is revealed before or after
the sampling. The model-based approach can inherently handle both cases, especially the latter case
with multiple reward functions, without re-sampling the data. Second, by establishing lower bounds
for both cases, we show that there is indeed a separation in sample complexity, which is unique in the
multi-agent setting. Third, we show that up to some logarithmic factors, the model-based approach
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is indeed minimax optimal in all parameters in the more challenging reward-agnostic case, and has
only a gap on the |A|, |B| (both agents’ action space size) dependence in the reward-aware case. This
separation and the (near-)minimax results have not only justified the sample efficiency of this simple
approach, but also highlighted both its power (easily handling multiple reward functions known in
hindsight) and its limitation (less adaptive and can hardly achieve optimal complexity with reward
knowledge), particularly arising in the multi-agent RL context. These results are first-of-their-kind
in model-based MARL, and among the first (near-)minimax results in general MARL, to the best of
our knowledge. We also believe that this separation may shed some light on the choice of model-free
and model-based approaches in various MARL scenarios in practice, and provide new understand-
ings for algorithm-design in other MARL settings, e.g., with no generative model, and going beyond
zero-sum MGs.
Related Work. Stemming from the formative work Littman (1994), MARL has been mostly studied
under the framework of Markov games (Shapley, 1953). There has definitely not been any shortage
of provably convergent MARL algorithms ever since then (Littman, 2001; Hu and Wellman, 2003;
Greenwald et al., 2003). However, most of these early results are Q-learning-based (thus model-
free) and asymptotic, with no sample complexity guarantees. To establish non-asymptotic results,
Pe´rolat et al. (2015); Pe´rolat et al. (2016a,b); Fan et al. (2019); Zhang et al. (2018b) have studied the
sample complexity of batch model-free MARL methods. There are also increasing interests in policy-
based (thus also model-free) methods for solving special MGs with non-asymptotic convergence
guarantees (Pe´rolat et al., 2018; Srinivasan et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019a). No result on the (near-
)minimax optimality of these complexities has been established.
Specific to the two-player zero-sum setting, Jia et al. (2019) and Sidford et al. (2019) have con-
sidered turn-based MGs, a special case of the simultaneous-move MGs considered here, with a gen-
erative model. Specifically, Sidford et al. (2019) established near-optimal sample complexity of
O˜((1 − γ)−3−2) for a variant of Q-learning for this setting. More recently, Bai and Jin (2020); Xie
et al. (2020) have established both regret and sample complexity guarantees for episodic zero-sum
MGs, without a generative model, with focus on efficient exploration. Shah et al. (2020) also focused
on the turn-based setting, and combined Monte-Carlo Tree Search and supervised learning to find
the NE values. In contrast, model-based MARL theory has relatively limited literature. Brafman
and Tennenholtz (2002) proposed the R-MAX algorithm for average-reward MGs, with polynomial
sample complexity. Wei et al. (2017) developed a model-based upper confidence algorithm with
polynomial sample complexities for the same setting. These methods differ from ours, as they are
either specific model-free approaches, or not clear yet if they are (near-)minimax optimal in the cor-
responding setups. Concurrent to our work, Bai et al. (2020) developed model-free algorithms with
near-optimal sample complexities in episodic settings without a generative model. The results are
optimal in |S|, |A|, |B| dependence, but not in the horizon H .
In the single-agent regime, there has been extensive literature on non-asymptotic efficiency of
RL in MDPs; see Kearns and Singh (1999); Kakade (2003); Strehl et al. (2009); Jaksch et al. (2010);
Azar et al. (2013); Osband and Van Roy (2014); Dann and Brunskill (2015); Azar et al. (2017); Wang
(2017); Sidford et al. (2018); Jin et al. (2018); Li et al. (2020). Amongst them, we highlight the mini-
max optimal ones: Azar et al. (2013) and Azar et al. (2017) have provided minimax optimal results
for sample complexity and regret in the settings with and without a generative model, respectively.
Specifically, Azar et al. (2013) has shown that to achieve the -optimal value in Markov decision
processes (MDPs), at least Ω˜(|S||A|(1−γ)−3−2) samples are needed, for  ∈ (0,1]. They also showed
that to find an -optimal policy, the same minimax complexity order in 1−γ and  can be attained,
if  ∈ (0, (1−γ)−1/2|S|−1/2] and the total sample complexity is O˜(|S|2|A|), which is in fact linear in the
model size. Later, Sidford et al. (2018) has proposed a Q-learning based approach to attain this lower
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bound and remove the extra dependence on |S|, for  ∈ (0,1]. More recently, Agarwal et al. (2019a)
developed new techniques based on absorbing MDPs, to show that model-based RL also achieves the
lower bound for finding an -optimal policy, with a larger  range of (0, (1 − γ)−1/2]1. Finally, our
separation of the reward-agnostic case is motivated by the recent novel framework of reward-free
RL in Jin et al. (2020).
2 Preliminaries
Zero-Sum Markov Games. Consider a zero-sum MG2 G characterized by (S ,A,B, P , r,γ), where S
is the state space; A,B are the action spaces of agents 1 and 2, respectively; P : S ×A × B → ∆(S)
denotes the transition probability of states; r : S ×A × B → [0,1] denotes the reward function3 of
agent 1 (thus −r is the bounded reward function of agent 2); and γ ∈ [0,1) is the discount factor. The
goal of agent 1 (agent 2) is to maximize (minimize) the long-term accumulative discounted reward.
In MARL, the agents aim to achieve this goal using data samples collected from the model.
At each time t, agent 1 (agent 2) has a stationary (not necessarily deterministic) policy µ : S →
∆(A) (ν : S → ∆(B)), where ∆(X ) denotes the space of all probability measures over X , so that at ∼
µ(· |st) (bt ∼ ν(· |st)). The state makes a transition from st to st+1 following the probability distribution
P (· |st , at ,bt), given (at ,bt). As in the MDP model, one can define the state-value function under a pair
of joint policies (µ,ν) as
V µ,ν(s) := Eat∼µ(· |st),bt∼ν(· |st)
[∑
t≥0
γ tr(st , at ,bt)
∣∣∣∣∣s0 = s].
Note that V µ,ν(s) ∈ [0,1/(1 − γ)] for any s ∈ S as r ∈ [0,1], and the expectation is taken over the
random trajectory produced by the joint policy (µ,ν). Also, the state-action/Q-value function under
(µ,ν) are defined by
Qµ,ν(s,a,b) := Eat∼µ(· |st),bt∼ν(· |st)
[∑
t≥0
γ tr(st , at ,bt)
∣∣∣∣∣s0 = s,a0 = a,b0 = b].
The solution concept usually considered is the (approximate) Nash equilibrium, as defined below.
Definition 2.1 ((-) Nash Equilibrium). For a zero-sum MG (S ,A,B, P , r,γ), a Nash equilibrium policy
pair (µ∗,ν∗) satisfies the following pair of inequalities4 for any s ∈ S , µ ∈ ∆(A)|S|, and ν ∈ ∆(B)|S|
V µ,ν
∗
(s) ≤ V µ∗,ν∗(s) ≤ V µ∗,ν(s). (2.1)
If (2.1) holds with some  > 0 relaxation, i.e., for some policy (µ′ ,ν′), such that
V µ,ν
′
(s)−  ≤ V µ′ ,ν′ (s) ≤ V µ′ ,ν(s) + , (2.2)
then (µ′ ,ν′) is an -Nash equilibrium policy pair.
1While preparing the present work, Li et al. (2020) has further improved the minimax optimal results in Agarwal et al.
(2019a), in that they cover the entire range of sample sizes. We believe the improvement can also be incorporated in the
MARL setting here, which is left as our future work.
2We will hereafter refer to this model simply as a MG.
3Our results can be generalized to other ranges of reward function by a standard reduction, see e.g., Sidford et al.
(2018), and randomized reward functions.
4In game theory, this pair is commonly referred to as saddle-point inequalities.
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By Shapley (1953); Patek (1997), there exists a Nash equilibrium policy pair (µ∗,ν∗) ∈ ∆(A)|S| ×
∆(B)|S| for two-player discounted zero-sum MGs. The state-value V ∗ := V µ∗,ν∗ is referred to as the
value of the game. The corresponding Q-value function is denoted by Q∗. The objective of the two
agents is to find the NE policy of the MG, namely, to solve the saddle-point problem
max
µ
min
ν
V µ,ν(s), (2.3)
for every s ∈ S , where the order of max and min can be interchanged (Von Neumann et al., 1953;
Shapley, 1953). For notational convenience, for any policy (µ,ν), we define
V µ,∗ = min
ν
V µ,ν , V ∗,ν = max
µ
V µ,ν , (2.4)
and denote the corresponding optimizers by ν(µ) and µ(ν), respectively. We refer to these values and
optimizers as the best-response values and policies, given µ and ν, respectively.
Reward-Aware v.s. Reward-Agnostic. We first differentiate between two algorithmic mechanisms
in the generative-model setting. In the reward-aware case, the reward function is either known to
the agents (Azar et al., 2013; Sidford et al., 2018; Agarwal et al., 2019a; Sidford et al., 2019; Li et al.,
2020), or can at least be estimated from data. The reward knowledge can thus be used to potentially
guide the sampling process, making the algorithm adaptive. In the reward-agnostic case, reward
knowledge is not used to guide sampling, and is possibly only revealed after the sampling. This
especially fits in the scenario when there is more than one reward function of interest, or when the
reward function is engineered iteratively, since it can now handle a class of reward functions that
are not pre-specified, without re-sampling the data for each of them. Existing works in single-agent
settings have no such a separation (Azar et al., 2013; Sidford et al., 2018; Agarwal et al., 2019b; Li
et al., 2020), as the sample complexity of estimating the reward function is typically of lower order,
and the reward function is thus assumed to be known. In particular, the model-based approaches
in Azar et al. (2013); Agarwal et al. (2019b); Li et al. (2020) are reward-agnostic, while the model-
free approaches in Sidford et al. (2018, 2019) are reward-aware. Interestingly, in two-agent Markov
games, whether the reward is known beforehand or not may lead to different sample complexity
lower-bounds, as we will see in §3.1. We thus point out this separation here for clarity.
Remark 2.2 (Reward-Agnostic & Reward-Free). The reward-agnostic case we advocate here is closely
related to the recent novel algorithmic framework of reward-free RL (Jin et al., 2020), where there
are also two phases, exploration and planning, while trajectories are only collected in the exploration
phase, without any reward knowledge, and various reward functions are fed to the algorithm for
evaluation in the planning phase. One key difference is that the reward-free setting aims to be effec-
tive for all reward function in the planning phase simultaneously, while the reward-agnostic setting
only focuses on handling the underlying single-reward (or a few reward functions) that is not pre-
specified. Being less general than the pure reward-free setting, the sample complexity bounds are
thus possibly better, as we will show in §3.
Model-Based Approach with Generative Model. As a standard setting, suppose that we have ac-
cess to a generative model/sampler, which can provide us with samples s′ ∼ P (· |s,a,b) for any (s,a,b).
The model-based MARL algorithm simply calls the sampler N times at each state-joint-action pair
(s,a,b), and constructs an empirical estimate of the transition model P , denoted by P̂ , following
P̂ (s′ |s,a,b) = count(s
′ , s,a,b)
N
.
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Here count(s′ , s,a,b) is the number of times the state-action pair (s,a,b) forces a transition to state s′.
Note that the reward function is not estimated, in either the reward-aware or reward-agnostic cases,
as for the former, the sample complexity of estimating r is only a lower order term, and r is thus
typically assumed to be known (Azar et al., 2013; Sidford et al., 2018; Agarwal et al., 2019a; Li et al.,
2020); while for the latter, no reward information is even available in the sampling processes. This
model-based approach via estimating P inherently handles both cases. Such a model-estimation can
be implemented by both agents independently.
Planning Oracle. The reward function, together with the empirical transition model P̂ and the
components (S ,A,γ) in the true model G, constitutes an empirical game model Ĝ. As in Azar et al.
(2013); Agarwal et al. (2019a); Jin et al. (2020); Li et al. (2020) for single-agent RL, we assume that
an efficient planning oracle is available, which takes Ĝ as input, and outputs a policy pair (µ̂, ν̂). This
oracle decouples the statistical and computational aspects of the empirical model Ĝ. The output pol-
icy pair, referred to as being near-equilibrium, is assumed to satisfy certain opt-order of equilibrium,
in terms of value functions, and we evaluate the performance of (µ̂, ν̂) on the original MG G. Com-
mon planning algorithms include value iteration (Shapley, 1953) and (generalized) policy iteration
(Patek, 1997; Pe´rolat et al., 2015), which are efficient in finding the NE of Ĝ. In addition, it is not
hard to have an oracle that is smooth in generating policies, i.e., the change of the approximate NE
policies can be bounded by the changes of the NE value. See our Definition 3.5 later for a formal
statement.
3 Main Results
We now introduce the main results of this paper. For notational convenience, we use V̂ µ,ν , V̂ µ,∗, V̂ ∗,ν ,
and V̂ ∗ to denote the value under (µ,ν), the best-response value under µ and ν, and the NE value,
under the empirical game model Ĝ, respectively. A similar convention is also used for Q-functions.
3.1 Lower Bounds
We first establish lower bounds on both approximating the NE value function and learning the -NE
policy pair, in both reward-aware and reward-agnostic cases.
Lemma 3.1 (Lower Bound for Reward-Aware Case). Let G be an unknown zero-sum MG, and the
agents learn in a reward-aware case, i.e., the reward knowledge is available during sampling. Then,
there exist 0,δ0 > 0, such that for all  ∈ (0,0), δ ∈ (0,δ0), the sample complexity of learning an
-NE policy pair, or an -approximate NE value, i.e., finding a Q̂ such that ‖Q̂−Q∗‖∞ ≤  for G, with
a generative model with probability at least 1− δ, is Ω˜
(
|S|(|A|+ |B|)(1−γ)−3−2 log(1/δ)
)
.
The proof of Lemma 3.1, via a straightforward adaptation from the lower bounds for MDPs (Azar
et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2019), is provided in §A.1. Note that as in Azar et al. (2013); Sidford et al.
(2018, 2019); Agarwal et al. (2019a); Li et al. (2020), the reward function is known in this case. As
we will show momentarily, our sample complexity is tight in 1−γ and |S|, while has a gap in |A|, |B|
dependence (O˜(|A||B|) versus Ω˜(|A| + |B|)). In §A.1, we discuss that the Ω˜(|A| + |B|) lower bound
may not be improved in this reward-aware case, and might be attainable by model-free algorithms
instead (as O˜(|A||B|) is inherent in model-based approaches due to estimating P ). Interestingly, in
the concurrent work Bai et al. (2020), under a different MARL setting, such an Ω˜(|A|+|B|) complexity
is indeed shown to be attainable by a model-free algorithm with online updates.
On the other hand, note that our model-based approach can inherently also handle the more
challenging reward-agnostic case. Indeed, estimating the transition model P seems a bit of an
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overkill for the reward-aware case, in terms of sample complexity. A natural two-part question
then becomes: what is the sample complexity lower bound in this more challenging reward-agnostic
case, and can the model-based approach attain it? We formally answer the first part of the question
in the following theorem, whose proof is deferred to §A.2, and answer the second part in §3.2 and
§3.3.
Theorem 3.2 (Lower Bound for Reward-Agnostic Case). Let G be an unknown zero-sum MG, and
the agents learn in a reward-agnostic case, i.e., they first call the generative model for sampling,
without reward knowledge, and then are fed with the reward function r in G, for finding either an
-NE policy pair, or an -approximate NE value for G. Then, there exist 0,δ0 > 0, such that for all
 ∈ (0,0), δ ∈ (0,δ0), the sample complexity of achieving either goal with probability at least 1−δ, is
Ω˜
( |S||A||B|
(1−γ)32 log
(1
δ
))
.
Compared to Lemma 3.1, the dependence on |A|, |B| is increased from Ω˜(|A| + |B|) to Ω˜(|A||B|).
Several remarks are now in order. First, this suggests that without guidance from the reward, the
reward-agnostic case can be more challenging to tackle. Intuitively, the reward known in hindsight,
which might be chosen adversarially, costs the algorithm to at least sample at all |A||B| elements in
the Q-value Q(s, ·, ·) at each state s often enough. Second, when reduced to the single-agent setting
(e.g., with |B| = 1), such a separation disappears, showing its unique emergence in the multi-agent
setting, and explaining why these two cases were not differentiated explicitly in the single-agent
literature. Third, this lower bound is also related to the reward-free setting (Jin et al., 2020) with a
single unknown reward (not infinitely many as in Jin et al. (2020)).
3.2 Near-Optimality in Finding -Approximate NE Value
We now establish the near-minimax optimal sample complexities of model-based MARL. Note that
theses results apply to both reward-aware and reward-agnostic cases, as the implementation of our
model-based approach does not rely on the reward function. We start by showing the sample com-
plexity to achieve an -approximate NE value.
Theorem 3.3 (Finding -Approximate NE Value). Suppose that the policy pair (µ̂, ν̂) is obtained from
the Planning Oracle using the empirical model Ĝ, which satisfies
‖V̂ µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ ∗‖∞ ≤ opt .
Then, for any δ ∈ [0,1] and  ∈ (0,1/(1−γ)1/2], if
N ≥ cγ log
[
c|S||A||B|(1−γ)−2δ−1
]
(1−γ)32
for some absolute constant c, it holds that with probability at least 1− δ,∥∥∥Qµ̂,ν̂ −Q∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ 23 + 5γopt1−γ , ∥∥∥Q̂µ̂,ν̂ −Q∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ + 9γopt1−γ .
Theorem 3.3 shows that if the planning error opt is made small, e.g., with the order ofO((1−γ)),
then the Nash equilibrium Q-value can be estimated with a sample complexity of O˜(|S||A||B|(1 −
γ)−3−2), as N queries are made for each (s,a,b) pair. This planning error can be achieved by per-
forming any efficient black-box optimization technique over the empirical model Ĝ. Examples of
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such oracles include value iteration (Shapley, 1953) and (generalized) policy iteration (Patek, 1997;
Pe´rolat et al., 2015). Moreover, note that different from the single-agent setting, where only a max
operator is used, a minmax (or maxmin) operator is used in these algorithms, which involves solving
a matrix game at each state. This can be solved as a linear program (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994),
with at best polynomial runtime complexity (Gro¨tschel et al., 1981; Karmarkar, 1984). This in total
leads to an efficient polynomial runtime complexity algorithm.
As per Lemma 3.1, our O˜(|S||A||B|(1 − γ)−3−2) complexity is near-minimax optimal for the
reward-aware case, in that it is tight in the dependence of 1 − γ and |S|, and sublinear in the
model-size (which is |S|2|A||B|). However, there is a gap on the |A|, |B| dependence (O˜(|A||B|) ver-
sus O˜(|A|+ |B|)). Unfortunately, without further assumption on the MG, e.g., being turn-based, the
model-based algorithm can hardly avoid the O˜(|S||A||B|) dependence, as it is required to estimate
each P̂ (· |s,a,b) accurately to perform the planning. It is only minimax-optimal if the action-space
size of one agent dominates the other’s (e.g., |A|  |B|).
In the reward-agnostic case, as per Theorem 3.2, O˜(|S||A||B|(1 − γ)−3−2) is indeed minimax-
optimal, and is tight in all |S|, |A|, |B| and 1−γ dependence. More significantly, in this case, more than
one reward functions can be handled simultaneously, as long as the transition model is estimated
accurately enough. Specifically, with M reward functions, by letting δ = δ/M in Theorem 3.3 and
using union bounds, the sample complexity of finding -approximate NE value corresponding to
all M reward functions becomes O˜(log(M)|S||A||B|(1−γ)−3−2), which, with M being polynomial in
|S|, |A|, |B|, is of the same order as that in Theorem 3.3.
However, this (near-)optimal result does not necessarily lead to near-optimal sample complexity
for obtaining the -NE policies. We first use a direct translation to obtain such an -NE policy pair
based on Theorem 3.3, for any Planning Oracle.
Corollary 3.4 (Finding -NE Policy). Let (µ̂, ν̂) and N satisfy the conditions in Theorem 3.3. Let
˜ :=
2
1−γ ·
(
+
9γopt
1−γ
)
,
and (µ˜, ν˜) be the one-step Nash equilibrium of Q̂µ̂,ν̂ , namely, for any s ∈ S(
µ˜(· |s), ν˜(· |s)
)
∈ argmax
u∈∆(A)
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ
[
Q̂µ̂,ν̂(s,a,b)
]
.
Then, with probability at least 1− δ,
V ∗,ν˜ − 2˜ ≤ V µ˜,ν˜ ≤ V µ˜,∗ + 2˜, (3.1)
namely, (µ˜, ν˜) constitutes a 2˜-Nash equilibrium policy pair.
Corollary 3.4 is equivalently to saying that the sample complexity of achieving an -NE policy
pair is O˜((1 − γ)−5−2). This is worse than the model-based single-agent setting (Agarwal et al.,
2019a), and also worse than both the model-free single-agent (Sidford et al., 2018) and turn-based
two-agent (Sidford et al., 2019) settings, where O˜((1 − γ)−3−2) can be achieved for learning the
optimal policy. This also has a gap from the lower bound in both Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. Note
that the above sample complexity still matches that of the Empirical QVI in Azar et al. (2013) if
 ∈ (0,1] for single-agent RL, but with a larger choice of  of (0, (1 − γ)−1/2]. As the Markov game
setting is more challenging than MDPs, it is not clear yet if the lower bounds in Lemma 3.1 and
Theorem 3.2 in finding -NE policies can be achieved, using a general Planning Oracle. In contrast,
we show next that a stable Planning Oracle can indeed (almost) match the lower bounds.
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3.3 Near-Optimality in Finding -NE Policy
Admittedly, Corollary 3.4 does not fully exploit the model-based approach, since it finds the NE
policy according to the Q-value estimate Q̂µ̂,ν̂ , instead of using the output policy pair (µ̂, ν̂) directly.
This loses a factor of 1−γ . To improve the sample complexity of obtaining the NE policies, we first
introduce the following definition of a smooth Planning Oracle.
Definition 3.5 (Smooth Planning Oracle). A smooth Planning Oracle generates policies that are
smooth with respect to the NE Q-values of the empirical model. Specifically, for two empirical
models Ĝ1 and Ĝ2, the generated near-equilibrium policy pair (µ̂1, ν̂1) and (µ̂2, ν̂2) satisfy that for
each s ∈ S , ‖µ̂1(· |s) − µ̂2(· |s)‖T V ≤ C · ‖Q̂∗1 − Q̂∗2‖∞ and ‖ν̂1(· |s) − ν̂2(· |s)‖T V ≤ C · ‖Q̂∗1 − Q̂∗2‖∞ for some
constant5 C > 0, where Q̂∗i is the NE Q-value of Ĝi for i = 1,2, and ‖·‖T V is the total variation distance.
Such a smooth Planning Oracle can be readily obtained in several ways. For example, one simple
(but possibly computationally expensive) approach is to output the average over the entire policy
space, using a softmax randomization over best-response values induced by Q̂∗. Specifically, for agent
1, the output µ̂ is given by
µ̂(· |s) =
∫
∆(A)
exp
(
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ
[
Q̂∗(s,a,b)
]/
τ
)
∫
∆(A) exp
(
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u′ ,b∼ϑ
[
Q̂∗(s,a,b)
]/
τ
)
du′
·udu,
where τ > 0 is some temperature constant. The output of ν̂ is analogous. With a small enough
τ , µ̂ approximates the exact solution to argmax
u∈∆(A)
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q̂∗(s,a,b)], the NE policy given Q̂∗.
Moreover, notice that µ̂ satisfies the smoothness condition in Definition 3.5. This is because for each
u ∈ ∆(A) in the integral: i) the softmax function is Lipschitz continuous with respect to the input
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ
[
Q̂∗(s,a,b)
]/
τ (Gao and Pavel, 2017); ii) the best-response value min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ
[
Q̂∗(s,a,b)
]
is smooth with respect to Q̂∗. Thus, such an oracle is an instance of the smooth Planning Oracle.
Another more tractable way to obtain (µ̂, ν̂) is by solving a regularized matrix game induced by
Q̂∗. Specifically, one solves(
µ̂(· |s), ν̂(· |s)
)
= argmax
u∈∆(A)
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ
[
Q̂∗(s,a,b)
]
− τ1Ω1(u) + τ2Ω2(ϑ), (3.2)
for each state s ∈ S , where Ωi is the regularizer for agent i’s policy, usually a strongly convex
function, τi > 0 are the temperature parameters. Such a strongly-convex-strongly-concave saddle
point problem admits a unique solution, and can be solved efficiently (Facchinei and Pang, 2007;
Cherukuri et al., 2017; Liang and Stokes, 2019). This regularized objective has been widely used in
both single-agent MDPs (Neu et al., 2017; Haarnoja et al., 2018; Chow et al., 2018; Geist et al., 2019),
and learning in games (Syrgkanis et al., 2015; Mertikopoulos and Sandholm, 2016; Grill et al., 2019),
to improve both the exploration and convergence properties.
With small enough τi , the solution to (3.2) will be close to that of the unregularized one (Geist
et al., 2019), up to some error captured by opt. More importantly, many commonly used regular-
izations, including negative entropy (Neu et al., 2017), Tsallis entropy (Chow et al., 2018) and Re´nyi
entropy with certain parameters (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm, 2016), naturally yield a smooth
Planning Oracle; see Lemma B.1 in §B.1 for a formal statement. Note that the smoothness of the
oracle does not affect the sample complexity of our model-based MARL algorithm.
5We allow C to depend polynomially on |A|, |B|, which, as we will show later, does not affect the sample complexity as
it appears as logC.
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Now we are ready to present another theorem, which gives the -Nash equilibrium policy pair
directly, with the (near-)minimax optimal sample complexity of O˜(|S||A||B|(1−γ)−3−2).
Theorem 3.6 (Finding -NE Policy with a Smooth Planning Oracle). Suppose that the policy pair
(µ̂, ν̂) is obtained from a smooth Planning Oracle using the empirical model Ĝ (see Definition 3.5),
which satisfies
‖V̂ µ̂,∗ − V̂ ∗‖∞ ≤ opt , ‖V̂ ∗,ν̂ − V̂ ∗‖∞ ≤ opt .
Then, for any δ ∈ [0,1] and  ∈ (0,1/(1−γ)1/2], if
N ≥ cγ log
[
c(C + 1)|S||A||B|(1−γ)−4δ−1
]
(1−γ)32
for some absolute constant c, then, letting ˜ := + 4opt/(1−γ), with probability at least 1− δ,
V ∗,ν̂ − 2˜ ≤ V µ̂,ν̂ ≤ V µ̂,∗ + 2˜,
namely, (µ̂, ν̂) constitutes a 2˜-Nash equilibrium policy pair.
Theorem 3.6 shows that the sample complexity of achieving an -NE policy can be near-minimax
optimal for the reward-aware case, and minimax-optimal for the reward-agnostic case, if a smooth
Planning Oracle is used. The dependence on |S| and 1−γ also matches the only known near-optimal
complexity in MGs in Sidford et al. (2019), with a turn-based setting and a model-free algorithm.
Inherited from Agarwal et al. (2019a), this improves the second result in Azar et al. (2013) that
also has O˜((1 − γ)−3−2) in finding an -optimal policy, by removing the dependence on |S|−1/2 and
enlarging the choice of  from (0, (1 − γ)−1/2|S|−1/2] to (0, (1 − γ)−1/2], and removing a factor of |S|
in the total sample complexity for any fixed . In addition, Theorem 3.6 also applies to the multi-
reward setting, as Theorem 3.3, by taking a union bound argument over all reward functions in the
reward-agnostic case. If the number of reward functions M is of order poly(|S|, |A|, |B|), the sample
complexity of handling multiple reward functions has the same order as that in Theorem 3.6.
Theorems 3.3 and 3.6 together for the first time justify that, this simple model-based MARL al-
gorithm is indeed sample-efficient, in approximating both the Nash equilibrium values and policies.
Moreover, our separation of the reward-aware and reward-agnostic cases highlights both the power
(easily handling multiple reward functions), and the limitation (less adaptive and can hardly achieve
O˜(|A|+ |B|)) of the model-based approach, particularly arising in the multi-agent RL context.
4 Proofs
We first introduce some additional notations for convenience.
Notations. For a matrix X ∈ Rm×n, X ≥ c for some scalar c ∈ R means that each element of X is
no-less than c. For a vector x, we use (x2),
√
x, |x| to denote the component-wise square, square-root,
and absolute value of x. We use P(s,a,b),s′ to denote the transition probability P (s′ |s,a,b), and Ps,a,b
to denote the vector P (· |s,a,b). We also use P µ,ν to denote the transition probability of state-action
pairs induced by the policy pair (µ,ν), which is defined as
P
µ,ν
(s,a,b),(s′ ,a′ ,b′) = µ(a
′ |s′)ν(b′ |s′)P (s′ |s,a,b).
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Hence, the Q-value function can be written as
Qµ,ν = r +γP µ,νQµ,ν = (I −γP µ,ν)−1r.
Also, for any V ∈ R|S|, we define the vector VarP (V ) ∈ R|S|×|A|×|B| as
VarP (V )(s,a,b) := VarP (· |s,a,b)(V ) = P (V )2 − (P V )2.
Then, we define Σ
µ,ν
G to be the variance of the discounted reward under the MG G, i.e.,
Σ
µ,ν
G (s,a,b) := E
[( ∞∑
t=0
γ tr(st , at ,bt)−Qµ,νG (s,a,b)
)2 ∣∣∣s0 = s,a0 = a,b0 = b].
It can be shown (see an almost identical formula for MDPs in (Azar et al., 2013, Lemma 6)) that Σ
µ,ν
G
satisfies some Bellman-type equation for any policy pair (µ,ν):
Σ
µ,ν
G = γ
2 VarP (V
µ,ν
G ) +γ
2P µ,νΣ
µ,ν
G . (4.1)
It can also be verified that ‖Σµ,νG ‖∞ ≤ γ2/(1 − γ)2 (Azar et al., 2013; Agarwal et al., 2019a). Before
proceeding further, we provide a roadmap for the proof.
Proof Roadmap. Our proof mainly consists of the following steps:
1. Helper lemmas and a crude bound. We first establish several important lemmas, including
the component-wise error bounds for the final Q-value errors, the variance error bound, and
a crude error bound that directly uses Hoeffding’s inequality. Some of the results are adapted
from the single-agent setting, to zero-sum MGs. See §4.1.
2. Establishing an auxiliary Markov game. To improve the crude bound, we build up an ab-
sorbing Markov game, in order to handle the statistical dependence between P̂ and some value
function generated by P̂ , which occurs as a product in the component-wise bound above. By
carefully designing the auxiliary game, we establish a Bernstein-like concentration inequality,
despite this dependency. See §4.2, more precisely, Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10.
3. Final bound for -approximate NE value. Lemma 4.9 in Step 2 allows us to exploit the vari-
ance bound, see Lemma 4.3, to obtain an O˜(√1/[(1−γ)3]N ) order bound on the Q-value er-
ror, leading to a O˜((1 − γ)−3−2) near-minimax optimal sample complexity for achieving the
-approximate NE value. See §4.3.
4. Final bounds for -NE policy. Based on the final bound in Step 3, we then establish a O˜((1−
γ)−5−2) sample complexity for obtaining an -NE policy pair, by solving an additional matrix
game over the output Q-value Q̂µ̂,ν̂ . See §4.4. In addition, given a smooth Planning Oracle,
by Lemma 4.10 in Step 2, and more careful self-bounding techniques, we establish a O˜((1 −
γ)−3−2) sample complexity for achieving such an -NE policy pair, directly using the output
policies (µ̂, ν̂). See §4.5.
4.1 Important Lemmas
We start with the component-wise error bounds.
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Lemma 4.1 (Component-Wise Bounds). For any policy pair (µ,ν), it follows that
Qµ,ν − Q̂µ,ν = γ(I −γP µ,ν)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ,ν ,
γ(I −γP̂ µ,ν(µ))−1(P − P̂ )V µ,∗ ≤Qµ,∗ − Q̂µ,∗ ≤ γ(I −γP µ,ν̂(µ))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ,∗,
γ(I −γP µ̂(ν),ν)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗,ν ≤Q∗,ν − Q̂∗,ν ≤ γ(I −γP̂ µ(ν),ν)−1(P − P̂ )V ∗,ν ,
where we recall that ν(µ) and µ(ν) denote the best-response policy given µ and ν, respectively (see
(2.4)). Moreover, we have
Qµ,ν ≥Q∗ − ‖Qµ,ν − Q̂µ,ν‖∞ − ‖Q̂µ,ν − Q̂∗‖∞ − ‖Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗‖∞ (4.2)
Qµ,ν ≤Q∗ + ‖Qµ,ν − Q̂µ,ν‖∞ + ‖Q̂µ,ν − Q̂∗‖∞ + ‖Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗‖∞ (4.3)
V µ,∗ ≥ V ∗ − ‖Qµ,∗ − Q̂µ,∗‖∞ − ‖V̂ µ,∗ − V̂ ∗‖∞ − ‖Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗‖∞ (4.4)
V ∗,ν ≤ V ∗ + ‖Q∗,ν − Q̂∗,ν‖∞ + ‖V̂ ∗,ν − V̂ ∗‖∞ + ‖Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗‖∞. (4.5)
Proof. First, note that
Qµ,ν − Q̂µ,ν = (I −γP µ,ν)−1r − (I −γP̂ µ,ν)−1r = (I −γP µ,ν)−1[(I −γP̂ µ,ν)− (I −γP µ,ν)]Q̂µ,ν
= γ(I −γP µ,ν)−1(P µ,ν − P̂ µ,ν)Q̂µ,ν = γ(I −γP µ,ν)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ,ν ,
proving the first equation. Also,
Qµ,∗ − Q̂µ,∗ ≤Qµ,ν̂(µ) − Q̂µ,∗ =Qµ,ν̂(µ) − Q̂µ,ν̂(µ)
=
(
I −γP µ,ν̂(µ)
)−1
r −
(
I −γP̂ µ,ν̂(µ)
)−1
r =
(
I −γP µ,ν̂(µ)
)−1[
(I −γP̂ µ,ν̂(µ))− (I −γP µ,ν̂(µ))
]
Q̂µ,ν̂(µ)
= γ(I −γP µ,ν̂(µ))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ,ν̂(µ),
where we recall that ν̂(µ)(· |s) ∈ argmin V̂ µ,ν(s) for all s ∈ S . By similar arguments, recalling that
ν(µ)(· |s) ∈ argminV µ,ν(s) for all s, we have
Qµ,∗ − Q̂µ,∗ ≥Qµ,ν(µ) − Q̂µ,ν(µ) = (I −γP µ,ν(µ))−1r − (I −γP̂ µ,ν(µ))−1r
= (I −γP̂ µ,ν(µ))−1[(I −γP̂ µ,ν(µ))− (I −γP µ,ν(µ))]Qµ,ν(µ) = γ(I −γP̂ µ,ν(µ))−1(P − P̂ )V µ,∗.
Similar arguments yield the third inequality in the first argument.
For the second argument, we have
Qµ,ν −Q∗ =Qµ,ν − Q̂∗ + Q̂∗ −Q∗ ≥Qµ,ν − Q̂∗ + Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗ ≥ −‖Qµ,ν − Q̂∗‖∞ − ‖Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗‖∞,
which, combined with triangle inequality, yields the first inequality. Similarly, we have
Qµ,ν −Q∗ =Qµ,ν − Q̂∗ + Q̂∗ −Q∗ ≤Qµ,ν − Q̂∗ + Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗ ≤ ‖Qµ,ν − Q̂∗‖∞ + ‖Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗‖∞,
Using triangle inequality proves the second inequality. For (4.4)-(4.5), we similarly have
V µ,∗ −V ∗ = V µ,∗ − V̂ ∗ + V̂ ∗ −V ∗ ≥ V µ,∗ − V̂ ∗ + V̂ µ∗,∗ −V ∗ ≥ −‖V µ,∗ − V̂ ∗‖∞ − ‖V̂ µ∗,∗ −V ∗‖∞, (4.6)
V ∗,ν −V ∗ = V ∗,ν − V̂ ∗ + V̂ ∗ −V ∗ ≤ V ∗,ν − V̂ ∗ + V̂ ∗,ν −V ∗ ≤ ‖V ∗,ν − V̂ ∗‖∞ + ‖V̂ ∗,ν −V ∗‖∞. (4.7)
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Notice that for any µ ∈ ∆(A)|S| and ν ∈ ∆(B)|S|,
‖V µ,∗ − V̂ µ,∗‖∞ =
∥∥∥∥ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ,∗(·, a,b)]− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q̂µ,∗(·, a,b)]
∥∥∥∥∞
≤ max
ϑ∈∆(B)
∥∥∥Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ,∗(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q̂µ,∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞ ≤ ‖Qµ,∗ − Q̂µ,∗‖∞ (4.8)
‖V ∗,ν − V̂ ∗,ν‖∞ =
∥∥∥∥ max
u∈∆(A)
Ea∼u,b∼ν(· |s)[Q∗,ν(·, a,b)]− max
u∈∆(A)
Ea∼u,b∼ν(· |s)[Q̂∗,ν(·, a,b)]
∥∥∥∥∞
≤ max
u∈∆(A)
∥∥∥Ea∼u,b∼ν(· |s)[Q∗,ν(·, a,b)]−Ea∼u,b∼ν(· |s)[Q̂∗,ν(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞ ≤ ‖Q∗,ν − Q̂∗,ν‖∞. (4.9)
Combining (4.6)-(4.7) and (4.8)-(4.9), together with triangle inequality, we arrive at (4.4)-(4.5), and
complete the proof.
The errors in (4.2)-(4.3) are decomposed into three terms. The second term ‖Q̂µ,ν − Q̂∗‖∞ is the
optimization error we obtained from the algorithm that solves the empirical game. This can be han-
dled by the algorithm. We will thus focus on bounding the other two terms. To this end, we need
the following lemma; see also Lemma 2 in Agarwal et al. (2019a).
Lemma 4.2. For any policy pair (µ,ν) and vector v ∈ R|S|×|A|×|B|, ‖(I −γP µ,ν)−1v‖∞ ≤ ‖v‖∞/(1−γ).
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Letting w = (I − γP µ,ν)−1v, we have v = (I − γP µ,ν)w. Triangle
inequality yields ‖v‖∞ ≥ ‖w‖∞ −γ‖P µ,νw‖∞ ≥ ‖w‖∞ −γ‖w‖∞, which completes the proof.
Next we establish the Bellman property of a policy pair (µ,ν)’s variance and its accumulation.
This has been observed for MDPs before in Munos and Moore (1999); Lattimore and Hutter (2012);
Azar et al. (2012); Agarwal et al. (2019a). We establish the counterpart for Markov games as follows.
Lemma 4.3. For any policy pair (µ,ν) and MG G with transition model P , we have∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ,ν)−1√VarP (V µ,νG )∥∥∥∥∞ ≤
√
2
(1−γ)3 .
Proof. The proof follows that of (Agarwal et al., 2019a, Lemma 3). For any positive vector v, by
Jensen’s inequality, we have
‖(I −γP µ,ν)−1√v‖∞ = 11−γ ‖(1−γ)(I −γP
µ,ν)−1
√
v‖∞ ≤
√∥∥∥∥ 11−γ (I −γP µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∥∞. (4.10)
Also, observe that
‖(I −γP µ,ν)−1v‖∞ = ‖(I −γP µ,ν)−1(I −γ2P µ,ν)(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v‖∞
=
∥∥∥[(I −γP µ,ν)−1(1−γ +γ −γ2P µ,ν)](I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞
=
∥∥∥[(1−γ)(I −γP µ,ν)−1 +γI](I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞
≤ (1−γ)∥∥∥(I −γP µ,ν)−1(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞ +γ∥∥∥(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞
≤ 1−γ
1−γ
∥∥∥(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞ +γ∥∥∥(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞ ≤ 2∥∥∥(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∞. (4.11)
Combining (4.10) and (4.11) yields
‖(I −γP µ,ν)−1√v‖∞ ≤
√∥∥∥∥ 21−γ (I −γ2P µ,ν)−1v∥∥∥∥∞. (4.12)
In addition, by (4.1), we have Σ
µ,ν
G = γ
2(I −γ2P µ,ν)−1 VarP (V µ,νG ). Letting v = VarP (V
µ,ν
G ) in (4.12) and
noticing that ‖Σµ,νG ‖∞ ≤ γ2/(1−γ)2 completes the proof.
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Finally, if we just apply Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain the following concentration argument,
upon which we will improve to obtain our final results.
Lemma 4.4. Let (µ∗,ν∗) be the Nash equilibrium policy pair under the actual model G. Then, for any
δ ∈ [0,1], with probability at least 1− δ, we have
‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗‖∞ ≤ ∆δ,N , ‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗‖∞ ≤ ∆δ,N , ‖Q∗ − Q̂∗,ν∗‖∞ ≤ ∆δ,N , ‖Q∗ − Q̂∗‖∞ ≤ ∆δ,N ,
where
∆δ,N :=
γ
(1−γ)2
√
2log(2|S||A||B|/δ)
N
.
Proof. First note that V ∗ is fixed and independent of the randomness in P̂ . Due to the boundedness
of V ∗ that ‖V ∗‖∞ ≤ (1 − γ)−1, and the union of Hoeffding bounds over S ×A×B, we have that with
probability at least 1− δ
∥∥∥(P̂ − P )V ∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ 11−γ ·
√
2log(2|S||A||B|/δ)
N
. (4.13)
On the other hand, let Tµ,ν be the Bellman operator under the true transition model P , using any
joint policy (µ,ν), i.e., for any s ∈ S and (s,a,b) ∈ S ×A×B, V ∈ R|S| and Q ∈ R|S|×|A|×|B|:
Tµ,ν(V )(s) = Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ν(· |s)
[
r(s,a,b) +γ · P (· |s,a,b)>V
]
Tµ,ν(Q)(s,a,b) = r(s,a,b) +γ ·Es′∼P (· |s,a,b),a′∼µ(· |s′),b′∼ν(· |s′)
[
Q(s′ , a′ ,b′)
]
.
Similarly, let T̂µ,ν be the corresponding operator defined under the estimated transition P̂ . Note that
Q̂µ,ν and Q∗ are the fixed points of T̂µ,ν and Tµ∗,ν∗ , respectively. We thus have
‖Q∗ − Q̂µ,ν‖∞ = ‖Tµ∗,ν∗Q∗ − T̂µ,νQ̂µ,ν‖∞
≤ ‖Tµ∗,ν∗Q∗ − r −γP̂ µ∗,ν∗Q∗‖∞ + ‖r +γP̂ µ∗,ν∗Q∗ − T̂µ,νQ̂µ,ν‖∞
= γ‖P µ∗,ν∗Q∗ − P̂ µ∗,ν∗Q∗‖∞ +γ‖P̂ µ∗,ν∗Q∗ − P̂ µ,νQ̂µ,ν‖∞
= γ‖P V ∗ − P̂ V ∗‖∞ +γ‖P̂ V ∗ − P̂ V̂ µ,ν‖∞ ≤ γ‖(P − P̂ )V ∗‖∞ +γ‖V ∗ − V̂ µ,ν‖∞. (4.14)
To show the first argument, letting µ = µ∗ and ν = ν∗, we have
γ‖V ∗ − V̂ µ∗,ν∗‖∞ = γ
∥∥∥Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ν∗(· |s)[Q∗(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ν∗(· |s)[Q̂µ∗,ν∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞
≤ γ‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗‖∞. (4.15)
Using (4.15) to bound the last term in (4.14), and solving for ‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗‖∞ from (4.14), we obtain
the first argument.
For the second argument, letting µ = µ∗ and ν = ν̂(µ∗) (note that Q̂µ∗,∗ = Q̂µ∗,ν̂(µ∗)), we have
γ‖V ∗ − V̂ µ∗,∗‖∞ = γ ·
∥∥∥ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q∗(·, a,b)]− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q̂µ
∗,∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞
≤ γ · max
ϑ∈∆(B)
∥∥∥Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q∗(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q̂µ∗,∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗‖∞, (4.16)
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where the first inequality is due to the non-expansiveness of the min operator. Using (4.16) to bound
the last term in (4.14), and solving for ‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗‖∞ from (4.14), we obtain the second argument.
Similarly, we can obtain the third argument.
For the fourth argument, letting µ = µ̂∗ and ν = ν̂∗, the NE policy under P̂ (note that Q̂µ̂∗,ν̂∗ = Q̂∗),
we have
γ‖V ∗ − V̂ ∗‖∞ = γ ·
∥∥∥ max
u∈∆(A)
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q∗(·, a,b)]− max
u∈∆(A)
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q̂∗(·, a,b)]
∥∥∥∞
≤ γ · max
u∈∆(A)
∥∥∥ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q∗(·, a,b)]− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q̂∗(·, a,b)]
∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ‖Q∗ − Q̂∗‖∞,
where the inequalities are due to the non-expansivenesses of both the max and the min operators.
This, combined with (4.14), completes the proof.
4.2 An Auxiliary Markov Game
Motivated by the absorbing MDP technique in Agarwal et al. (2019a), we propose to introduce an
absorbing Markov game, in order to handle the interdependence between P̂ and V̂ µ,ν , for any µ,ν
(which may also depend on P̂ ), which will show up frequently in the analysis.
We now define a new Markov game Gs,u as follows (with s ∈ S and u ∈ R a constant): Gs,u is iden-
tical to G, except that PGs,u (s |s,a,b) = 1 for all (a,b) ∈ A×B, namely, state s is an absorbing state; and
the instantaneous reward at s is always (1− γ)u. The rest of the reward function and the transition
model of Gs,u are the same as those of G. For notational simplicity, we now use Xµ,νs,u to denote Xµ,νGs,u ,
where X can be either the value functions Q and V , or the reward function r, under the model Gs,u .
Obviously, for any policy pair (µ,ν), V
µ,ν
s,u (s) = u for the absorbing state s.
In addition, we define Us for some state s to choose u from, which is a set of evenly spaced ele-
ments in the interval [V ∗(s)−∆,V ∗(s)+∆] for some ∆ > 0, i.e., Us ⊂ [V ∗(s)−∆,V ∗(s)+∆]. An appropri-
ately chosen size of |Us| will be the key in the proof. We also use P̂Gs,u to denote the transition model
of the absorbing MG for the empirical MG Ĝ, denoted by Ĝs,u . Specifically, at all non-absorbing
states, P̂Gs,u is identical to P̂ ; while at the absorbing state, P̂Gs,u (s |s,a,b) = 1 for any (a,b) ∈ A×B. The
corresponding value functions are for short denoted by V̂
µ,ν
s,u and Q̂
µ,ν
s,u . Similar as in the original MG,
we also use V̂ ∗s,u to denote the NE value under the model Ĝs,u , and use V̂ µ,∗s,u and V̂ ∗,νs,u to denote the
best-response values of some given µ and ν, under the model Ĝs,u . Now we first have the following
lemma based on Bernstein’s inequality; see a similar argument in Lemma 5 in Agarwal et al. (2019a).
Lemma 4.5. For fixed state s, action (a,b), a finite set Us, and δ ≥ 0, it holds that for all u ∈ Us, with
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probability greater than 1− δ,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b) · V̂ ∗s,u ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ ∗s,u)
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N ,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b) · V̂ µ∗,∗s,u ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂
µ∗,∗
s,u )
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N ,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b) · V̂ ∗,ν∗s,u ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b(V̂ ∗,ν
∗
s,u )
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N ,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b) · V̂ µ∗,ν∗s,u ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b(V̂
µ∗,ν∗
s,u )
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N ,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b) ·V µ̂s,u ,∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V µ̂s,u ,∗)
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N ,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b) ·V ∗,ν̂s,u ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b(V ∗,ν̂s,u )
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N ,
where Ps,a,b and P̂s,a,b are the transition models extracted from the original game G and its empirical
version Ĝ, respectively (not related to either Gs,u or Ĝs,u), and (µ̂s,a, ν̂s,a) is the output of the Planning
Oracle using the auxiliary empirical model Ĝs,u
Proof. The key observation is that the random variables P̂s,a,b and V̂ ∗s,u are independent. Using Bern-
stein’s inequality along with a union bound over all u ∈ Us, we obtain the first inequality. The other
inequalities follow similarly, as P̂s,a,b is independent of V̂
µ∗,∗
s,u , V̂
∗,ν∗
s,u , V̂
µ∗,ν∗
s,u , V µ̂s,u ,∗, and V ∗,ν̂s,u . This is
because the latter terms are all decided by the original game G, and/or the auxiliary empirical game
Ĝs,u (not the original empirical game Ĝ).
Note that the arguments in Lemma 4.5 do not hold, if we replace V̂ ∗s,u by V̂ ∗, or V̂
µ∗,∗
s,u by V̂ µ
∗,∗, or
V̂ ∗,ν
∗
s,u by V̂ ∗,ν
∗
. It will neither hold if we replace V̂
µ∗,∗
s,u and V µ̂s,u ,∗ by some V̂ µ,∗ and V µ,∗, for any µ that
is dependent on P̂ , e.g., the NE policy µ̂∗ for the original empirical game Ĝ. This is one of the key
subtleties that are worth emphasizing.
Next we establish two helpful lemmas that help guide the choices of Us, so that V̂ ∗s,u (resp. V̂
µ∗,∗
s,u ,
V̂ ∗,ν
∗
s,u , and V̂
µ∗,ν∗
s,u ) will be a good approximate of V̂ ∗ (resp. V̂ µ
∗,∗, V̂ ∗,ν∗ , and V̂ µ∗,ν∗).
Lemma 4.6. For the absorbing state s, and any joint policy (µ,ν), suppose that u∗ = V ∗G(s), u
µ,∗ =
V
µ,∗
G (s), u
∗,ν = V ∗,νG (s), and u
µ,ν = V
µ,ν
G (s). Then,
V ∗G = V
∗
s,u∗ V
µ,∗
G = V
µ,∗
Gs,uµ,∗ V
∗,ν
G = V
∗,ν
Gs,u∗,ν V
µ,ν
G = V
µ,ν
Gs,uµ,ν .
Proof. For the first formula, we need to verify that V ∗G satisfies the optimal (Nash equilibrium) Bell-
man equation for the game Gs,u∗ . To this end, note that if s′ = s, then u∗ = V ∗G(s) satisfies the Bellman
equation trivially, since s is absorbing with the value V ∗s,u∗(s) = u∗.
On the other hand, for any s′ , s, the outgoing transition model at s′ in Gs,u∗ is the same as that in
G, and V ∗G(s′) per se satisfies the Bellman equation in G (which are the same for Gs,u∗ at these states
s′ , s). Thus, V ∗G satisfies the Bellman equation in Gs,u∗ for all states. This proves the first equation.
The proofs for the remaining three equations are analogous.
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Perfect choices of u have been specified in Lemma 4.6 above. Moreover, we need to quantify how
the value changes if we deviate from these perfect choices, i.e., the robustness to misspecification of
u (Agarwal et al., 2019a). This result is formally established in the following lemma; see also Lemma
7 in Agarwal et al. (2019a) for a similar result.
Lemma 4.7. For any state s, u,u′ ∈ R, and joint policy pair (µ,ν), we have∥∥∥V ∗s,u −V ∗s,u′∥∥∥∞ ≤ |u −u′ |, ∥∥∥V µ,∗s,u −V µ,∗s,u′∥∥∥∞ ≤ |u −u′ |,∥∥∥V ∗,νs,u −V ∗,νs,u′∥∥∥∞ ≤ |u −u′ |, ∥∥∥V µ,νs,u −V µ,νs,u′ ∥∥∥∞ ≤ |u −u′ |.
Proof. Note that ‖rs,u − rs,u′‖∞ = (1 − γ)|u − u′ |, since the reward functions only differ at s, where
rs,u(s,a,b) = (1 − γ)u and rs,u′ (s,a,b) = (1 − γ)u′. We denote the NE policy pair in Gs,u by (µ∗s,u ,ν∗s,u).
Thus,
Q∗s,u −Q∗s,u′ =Qµ
∗
s,u ,ν
∗
s,u
s,u −Qµ
∗
s,u′ ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u′ ≤Q
µ∗s,u ,ν∗s,u′
s,u −Qµ
∗
s,u ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u′ (4.17)
=
(
I −γP µ
∗
s,u ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u
)−1
rs,u −
(
I −γP µ
∗
s,u ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u′
)−1
rs,u′ (4.18)
=
(
I −γP µ
∗
s,u ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u
)−1(
rs,u − rs,u′
)
(4.19)
≤ ‖rs,u − rs,u′‖∞
1−γ = |u −u
′ |, (4.20)
where (4.17) uses the fact that at the NE,
V
µ∗s,u ,ν∗s,u
s,u = min
ν
V
µ∗s,u ,ν
s,u ≤ V µ
∗
s,u ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u , V
µ∗s,u′ ,ν
∗
s,u′
s,u′ = maxµ
V
µ,ν∗s,u′
s,u′ ≥ V
µ∗s,u ,ν∗s,u′
s,u′ ,
implying the relationships of the corresponding Q-values; (4.18) is by definition; (4.19) uses the ob-
servation that P
µ∗s,u ,ν∗s,u′
s,u is the same as P
µ∗s,u ,ν∗s,u′
s,u′ (transition is not affected by the value of u). Similarly,
we can establish the lower bound that Q∗s,u −Q∗s,u′ ≥ −|u − u′ |, which proves ‖Q∗s,u −Q∗s,u′‖∞ ≤ |u − u′ |.
Moreover, we have∥∥∥V ∗s,u −V ∗s,u′∥∥∥∞ = ∥∥∥∥ maxu∈∆(A) minϑ∈∆(B)Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q∗s,u(·, a,b)]− maxu∈∆(A) minϑ∈∆(B)Ea∼u,b∼ϑ[Q∗s,u′ (·, a,b)]∥∥∥∥∞
≤ max
u∈∆(A),ϑ∈∆(B)
∥∥∥∥Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q∗s,u(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q∗s,u′ (·, a,b)]∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∥Q∗s,u −Q∗s,u′∥∥∥∞ ≤ |u −u′ |,
which proves the first inequality.
For the second one, recalling that the best-response policy of µ under Gs,u being νs,u(µ), we have
Q
µ,∗
s,u −Qµ,∗s,u′ = minν Q
µ,ν
s,u −Qµ,∗s,u′ = minν
(
I −γP µ,νs,u
)−1
rs,u −Qµ,∗s,u′ (4.21)
≤
(
I −γP µ,νs,u′ (µ)s,u
)−1
rs,u −
(
I −γP µ,νs,u′ (µ)s,u′
)−1
rs,u′ (4.22)
=
(
I −γP µ,νs,u′ (µ)s,u
)−1(
rs,u − rs,u′
)
≤ ‖rs,u − rs,u′‖∞
1−γ = |u −u
′ |, (4.23)
where (4.21) uses the definition of a best-response value, (4.22) plugs in the best-response policy
νs,u′ (µ), and (4.23) also uses the fact that the transition does not depend on the value u. A lower
bound can be established by noticing that Q
µ,∗
s,u′ = minνQ
µ,ν
s,u′ ≤Qµ,νs,u(µ)s,u′ . This proves ‖Qµ,∗s,u −Qµ,∗s,u′‖∞ ≤|u −u′ |. Furthermore, notice that∥∥∥V µ,∗s,u −V µ,∗s,u′∥∥∥∞ = ∥∥∥∥ minϑ∈∆(B)Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ,∗s,u(·, a,b)]− minϑ∈∆(B)Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ,∗s,u′ (·, a,b)]∥∥∥∥∞
≤ max
ϑ∈∆(B)
∥∥∥∥Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ,∗s,u(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ,∗s,u′ (·, a,b)]∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∥Qµ,∗s,u −Qµ,∗s,u′∥∥∥∞ ≤ |u −u′ |,
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which proves the second inequality. Similar arguments can also be used to establish the third and
the fourth inequalities. This completes the proof.
We are now ready to show the main result in this section.
Lemma 4.8. For any state s, joint action pair (a,b), and a finite set Us, with probability greater than
1− δ, we have
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ ∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us |/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ ∗)
N
+
2log(4|Us |/δ)
3(1−γ)N + minu∈Us
∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣ · 2 +
√
2log(4|Us |/δ)
N

∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ µ∗,∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us |/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ µ∗,∗)
N
+
2log(4|Us |/δ)
3(1−γ)N + minu∈Us
∣∣∣V̂ µ∗,∗(s)−u∣∣∣ · 2 +
√
2log(4|Us |/δ)
N

∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ ∗,ν∗ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us |/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ ∗,ν∗ )
N
+
2log(4|Us |/δ)
3(1−γ)N + minu∈Us
∣∣∣V̂ ∗,ν∗(s)−u∣∣∣ · 2 +
√
2log(4|Us |/δ)
N

∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ µ∗,ν∗ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us |/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ µ∗,ν∗ )
N
+
2log(4|Us |/δ)
3(1−γ)N + minu∈Us
∣∣∣V̂ µ∗,ν∗(s)−u∣∣∣ · 2 +
√
2log(4|Us |/δ)
N
.
Moreover, recalling that (µ̂s,u , ν̂s,u) is the output of the Planning Oracle using Ĝs,u , we have
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V µ̂,∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us |/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V µ̂,∗)
N
+
2log(4|Us |/δ)
3(1−γ)N + minu∈Us
∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V µ̂s,u ,∗∥∥∥∞
2 +
√
2log(4|Us |/δ)
N
,
∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V ∗,ν̂ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log(4|Us |/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V ∗,ν̂)
N
+
2log(4|Us |/δ)
3(1−γ)N + minu∈Us
∥∥∥V ∗,ν̂ −V ∗,ν̂s,u∥∥∥∞
2 +
√
2log(4|Us |/δ)
N
.
Proof. First, for all u ∈Us and with probability greater than 1− δ, we have∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ ∗∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)(V̂ ∗ − V̂ ∗s,u + V̂ ∗s,u)∣∣∣
≤ ∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)(V̂ ∗ − V̂ ∗s,u)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ ∗s,u ∣∣∣ (4.24)
≤ 2 · ∥∥∥V̂ ∗ − V̂ ∗s,u∥∥∥∞ + ∣∣∣(Ps,a,b − P̂s,a,b)V̂ ∗s,u ∣∣∣ (4.25)
≤ 2 · ∥∥∥V̂ ∗ − V̂ ∗s,u∥∥∥∞ +
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ ∗s,u)
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N (4.26)
≤ ∥∥∥V̂ ∗ − V̂ ∗s,u∥∥∥∞
2 +
√
2log(4|Us|/δ)
N
+
√
2log(4|Us|/δ) ·VarPs,a,b (V̂ ∗)
N
+
2log(4|Us|/δ)
3(1−γ)N (4.27)
where (4.24)-(4.25) use triangle inequality, (4.26) is due to Lemma 4.5, and (4.27) uses the facts that√
VarPs,a,b (X +Y ) ≤
√
VarPs,a,b(X) +
√
VarPs,a,b (Y ), and
√
VarPs,a,b (X) ≤ ‖X‖∞. Moreover, by Lemmas 4.6
and 4.7, we obtain that ∥∥∥V̂ ∗ − V̂ ∗s,u∥∥∥∞ = ∥∥∥V̂ ∗s,V̂ ∗(s) − V̂ ∗s,u∥∥∥∞ ≤ ∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣,
which, combined with (4.27) and taken minimization over all u ∈ Us, yields the first inequality.
Proofs for the remaining inequalities are analogous, except that for the last two, the norms ‖V µ̂,∗ −
V µ̂s,u ,∗‖∞ and ‖V ∗,ν̂ −V ∗,ν̂s,u‖∞ are kept and not further bounded.
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Next we establish the important result that characterizes the errors |(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗|, |(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,∗|,
|(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗,ν∗ |, and |(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,ν∗ |, which could not have been handled without the arguments above,
due to the dependence between P̂ and V̂ ∗ (and also V̂ µ∗,∗, V̂ ∗,ν∗ , and V̂ µ∗,ν∗).
Lemma 4.9. For any δ ∈ [0,1], with probability greater than 1− δ, it holds that
∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
·VarP (V̂ ∗)
N
+∆′δ,N
∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
·VarP (V̂ µ∗,∗)
N
+∆′δ,N
∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗,ν∗ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
·VarP (V̂ ∗,ν∗)
N
+∆′δ,N
∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,ν∗ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
·VarP (V̂ µ∗,ν∗)
N
+∆′δ,N
where ∆′δ,N is defined as
∆′δ,N =
√
c log
(
c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
+
c log
(
c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
(1−γ)N ,
and c is some absolute constant.
Proof. Let Us denote a set with evenly spaced elements in the interval [V ∗(s)−∆δ/2,N ,V ∗(s) +∆δ/2,N ],
with |Us| = 2/(1−γ)2, and ∆δ,N being defined in Lemma 4.4. Lemma 4.4 shows that with probability
greater than 1− δ/2,
V̂ ∗(s) ∈
[
V ∗(s)−∆δ/2,N , V ∗(s) +∆δ/2,N
]
(4.28)
for all s ∈ S . Since each subinterval determined by Us is of length 2∆δ/2,N /(|Us| − 1), and V̂ ∗(s) will
fall into one of them, we know that
min
u∈Us
∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣ ≤ 2∆δ/2,N|Us| − 1 = 2γ(|Us| − 1)(1−γ)2
√
2log(4|S||A||B|/δ)
N
≤ 2γ
√
2log(4|S||A||B|/δ)
N
,
where we have used the fact that |Us| ≥ 1/(1 − γ)2 + 1. We then choose δ/2 to be δ/(2|S||A||B|) in
Lemma 4.8, so that it holds for all states and joint actions with probability greater than 1 − δ/2.
By substitution and noting that the two events in Lemmas 4.4 and 4.8 both fail with probability
δ/2, we obtain the first inequality by properly choosing the constant c. Similarly, for the other two
inequalities, note that Lemma 4.4 can be applied to show that V̂ µ
∗,∗(s), V̂ ∗,ν∗(s), and V̂ µ∗,ν∗(s), all lie
in the interval in (4.28) (centered at V ∗(s)). By similar arguments, the remaining three inequalities
can be proved (note that Lemma 4.8 can be applied to V̂ µ
∗,∗(s), V̂ ∗,ν∗(s), and V̂ µ∗,ν∗(s), as well).
Lastly, with a smooth Planning Oracle, see Definition 3.5, we can similarly establish the follow-
ing error bounds on |(P − P̂ )V µ̂,∗| and |(P − P̂ )V ∗,ν̂ |, thanks to Lemma 4.8.
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Lemma 4.10. With a smooth Planning Oracle that has a smooth constant C (see Definition 3.5), for
any δ ∈ [0,1], with probability greater than 1− δ, it holds that
∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V µ̂,∗∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
·VarP (V µ̂,∗)
N
+∆′′δ,N
∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V ∗,ν̂ ∣∣∣ ≤
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
·VarP (V ∗,ν̂)
N
+∆′′δ,N
where ∆′′δ,N is defined as
∆′′δ,N =
√
c log
(
c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
+
c log
(
c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
(1−γ)N ,
for some absolute constant c.
Proof. Following the proof of Lemma 4.9, let Us denote a set with evenly spaced elements in the
interval [V ∗(s) − ∆δ/2,N ,V ∗(s) + ∆δ/2,N ], with ∆δ,N being defined in Lemma 4.4. By Lemma 4.4, we
know that V̂ ∗(s) lies in this interval with probability greater than 1 − δ/2, for all s ∈ S . Now we
choose |Us| = (C + 1)/(1 − γ)4, where C is the smooth coefficient in Definition 3.5. As V̂ ∗(s) will fall
into one of the subintervals determined by Us, we have
min
u∈Us
∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣ ≤ 2∆δ/2,N|Us| − 1 ≤ 2γ(1−γ)
2
C
·
√
2log(4|S||A||B|/δ)
N
, (4.29)
which also uses the fact |Us| ≥ C/(1−γ)4 +1. Furthermore, by Definition 3.5 and the proof of Lemma
4.7, we have ∥∥∥µ̂− µ̂s,u∥∥∥T V ≤ C · ‖Q̂∗ − Q̂∗s,u‖∞ ≤ C · ∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣. (4.30)
On the other hand, we have∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V µ̂s,u ,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ maxϑ∈∆(B)∥∥∥Ea∼µ̂(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ̂,∗(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ̂s,u(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ̂s,u ,∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞
≤ max
ϑ∈∆(B)
∥∥∥Ea∼µ̂(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ̂,∗(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ̂(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ̂s,u ,∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞
+ max
ϑ∈∆(B)
∥∥∥Ea∼µ̂(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ̂s,u ,∗(·, a,b)]−Ea∼µ̂s,u(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ̂s,u ,∗(·, a,b)]∥∥∥∞
≤ ∥∥∥Qµ̂,∗ −Qµ̂s,u ,∗∥∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥µ̂− µ̂s,u∥∥∥T V · ∥∥∥Qµ̂s,u ,∗∥∥∥∞ (4.31)
≤ γ∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V µ̂s,u ,∗∥∥∥∞ + C1−γ · ∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣, (4.32)
where (4.31) uses Ho¨lder’s inequality, and (4.32) follows by expanding the Q-value functions, using
(4.30), and noticing that ‖Qµ̂s,u ,∗‖∞ ≤ 1/(1 − γ). Combining (4.32) and (4.29), and taking min over
u ∈Us, we have
min
u∈Us
∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V µ̂s,u ,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ C(1−γ)2 ·minu∈Us ∣∣∣V̂ ∗(s)−u∣∣∣ ≤ 2γ ·
√
2log(4|S||A||B|/δ)
N
.
The rest of the proof follows the arguments of Lemma 4.9, which combines the last two inequalities
in Lemma 4.8 to obtain the desired bound. Note that the absolute constant here might be different
from that in Lemma 4.9. The proof for the second inequality is analogous.
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4.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.3. To this end, we first establish the following lemma.
Lemma 4.11. For any policy pair (µ̂, ν̂) that satisfies the condition in Theorem 3.3, there exists some
absolute constant c such that
∥∥∥Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ1−αδ,N

√
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)2N

+
1
1−αδ,N ·
γopt
(1−γ)
1 +
√
log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
N

∥∥∥Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ1−αδ,N

√
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)2N

∥∥∥Q∗ − Q̂∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ1−αδ,N

√
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)2N
,
where
αδ,N =
γ
1−γ
√
2log(16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
N
.
Proof. Note that
‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞ = γ
∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ̂,ν̂∥∥∥∞ (4.33)
≤ γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗∥∥∥∞ +γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1(P − P̂ )(V̂ µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ ∗)∥∥∥∞ (4.34)
≤ γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗∣∣∣∥∥∥∞ + 2γopt1−γ , (4.35)
where (4.33) is due to Lemma 4.1; (4.34) uses triangle inequality; and (4.35) is due to the non-
negativeness of the entries in (I − γP µ̂,ν̂)−1, the sub-optimality of (µ̂, ν̂), and Lemma 4.2. Since the
first term in (4.35) can be bounded using Lemma 4.9, we have
‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞ ≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1√VarP (V̂ ∗)∥∥∥∥∞ + γ∆
′
δ,N
1−γ +
2γopt
1−γ
≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1(√VarP (V µ̂,ν̂) +√VarP (V µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ µ̂,ν̂))∥∥∥∥∞
+γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂)−1(√VarP (V̂ µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ ∗))∥∥∥∥∞ + γ∆
′
δ,N
1−γ +
2γopt
1−γ
(4.36)
≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N

√
2
(1−γ)3 +
‖V µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ µ̂,ν̂‖∞
1−γ +
opt
1−γ
+ γ∆′δ,N1−γ + 2γopt1−γ
(4.37)
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≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N

√
2
(1−γ)3 +
‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞
1−γ +
opt
1−γ
+ γ∆′δ,N1−γ + 2γopt1−γ
(4.38)
= γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N

√
2
(1−γ)3 +
‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞
1−γ
+ γ∆′δ,N1−γ
+
2 +
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
 · γopt1−γ , (4.39)
where (4.36) uses the fact that
√
VarP (X +Y ) ≤
√
VarP (X)+
√
VarP (Y ); (4.37) is due to Lemma 4.3, the
fact that
√
VarP (V µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ µ̂,ν̂) ≤ ‖V µ̂,ν̂−V̂ µ̂,ν̂‖∞, and ‖V̂ µ̂,ν̂−V̂ ∗‖∞ ≤ opt; (4.38) is due to ‖V µ̂,ν̂−V̂ µ̂,ν̂‖∞ ≤
‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞. Solving for ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞ in (4.39) yields the desired inequality.
For the second inequality, by Lemma 4.1, we first have
γ(I −γP µ∗,ν∗)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,ν∗︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Qµ∗ ,ν∗−Q̂µ∗ ,ν∗
≤Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗ =Qµ∗,ν∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗ ≤ γ(I −γP µ∗,ν̂(µ∗))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,∗︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
Qµ∗ ,ν̂(µ∗)−Q̂µ∗ ,∗
.
Thus, we obtain that∥∥∥Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤max {∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞, ∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν̂(µ∗) − Q̂µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞}
= max
{
γ
∥∥∥(I −γP µ∗,ν∗)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞, γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ∗,ν̂(µ∗))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞}. (4.40)
For the first term in the max operator above, by similar arguments from (4.36)-(4.39), we have∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞ = γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ∗,ν∗)−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞
≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ∗,ν∗)−1√VarP (V̂ µ∗,ν∗)∥∥∥∥∞ + γ∆
′
δ,N
1−γ (4.41)
≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ∗,ν∗)−1√VarP (V µ∗,ν∗ − V̂ µ∗,ν∗)∥∥∥∥∞
+γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP µ∗,ν∗)−1√VarP (V µ∗,ν∗)∥∥∥∥∞ + γ∆
′
δ,N
1−γ (4.42)
≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
·
∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞
1−γ
+γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
·
√
2
(1−γ)3 +
γ∆′δ,N
1−γ , (4.43)
where (4.41) is due to Lemma 4.9, (4.42) uses triangle inequality, and (4.44) uses Lemma 4.3. Solving
for
∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν∗ − Q̂µ∗,ν∗∥∥∥∞ gives the bound for it.
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Similarly, the second term in the max operator in (4.40) can be bounded by
∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν̂(µ∗) − Q̂µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
·
∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν̂(µ∗) − Q̂µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞
1−γ
+γ
√
2log
(
16|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ]
)
N
·
√
2
(1−γ)3 +
γ∆′δ,N
1−γ , (4.44)
which can be solved to obtain a bound for
∥∥∥Qµ∗,ν̂(µ∗)−Q̂µ∗,∗∥∥∥∞. Combining the two bounds and (4.40),
we prove the second inequality in the lemma. The proof for the third inequality is analogous.
With Lemma 4.11 in hand, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.3. Note that the condition on N in
Theorem 3.3 makes αδ,N < 1/2. Thus, by (4.2)-(4.3) in Lemma 4.1 with (µ,ν) being replaced by (µ̂, ν̂),
we have
−‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞ −γopt − ‖Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗‖∞ ≤Qµ̂,ν̂ −Q∗ ≤ ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞ +γopt + ‖Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗‖∞,
where we use
‖Q̂µ̂,ν̂ − Q̂∗‖∞ = γ‖P V̂ µ̂,ν̂ − P V̂ ∗‖∞ ≤ γ‖V̂ µ̂,ν̂ − V̂ ∗‖∞ ≤ γopt .
Substituting in the bounds of ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞, ‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗‖∞, and ‖Q∗ − Q̂∗,ν∗‖∞ in Lemma 4.11, we
arrive at the final bound for ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ −Q∗‖∞:
‖Qµ̂,ν̂ −Q∗‖∞ ≤ 4γ

√
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)2δ])
(1−γ)2N
+ 4γopt1−γ +γopt .
With a certain choice of c, we have ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ −Q∗‖∞ ≤ 2/3 + 5γopt/(1−γ).
For the last argument in Theorem 3.3, by triangle inequality, with the same constant c used
above, we have
‖Q̂µ̂,ν̂ −Q∗‖∞ ≤ ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ −Q∗‖∞ + ‖Q̂µ̂,ν̂ −Qµ̂,ν̂‖∞ ≤ +
9γopt
1−γ ,
which completes the proof.
4.4 Proof of Corollary 3.4
We now prove Corollary 3.4, based on Theorem 3.3. For any state s, we have
V ∗(s)−V µ˜,∗(s) = min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Qµ˜,∗(s,a,b)
]
= min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
+ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Qµ˜,∗(s,a,b)
]
≤ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
+γ‖V ∗ −V µ˜,∗‖∞ (4.45)
≤ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q̂µ̂,ν̂(s,a,b)
]
+ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q̂µ̂,ν̂(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
+γ‖V ∗ −V µ˜,∗‖∞ (4.46)
≤ 2∥∥∥Q∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂∥∥∥∞ +γ‖V ∗ −V µ˜,∗‖∞, (4.47)
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where (4.45) uses the fact that
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q∗(s,a,b)
]
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Qµ˜,∗(s,a,b)
]
≤ max
ϑ∈∆(B)
∣∣∣∣∣Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ[Q∗(s,a,b)]−Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ[Qµ˜,∗(s,a,b)]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ γ‖V ∗ −V µ˜,∗‖∞,
and (4.46) is due to the fact that
− min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ∗(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q̂µ̂,ν̂(s,a,b)
]
+ min
ϑ∈∆(B)
Ea∼µ˜(· |s),b∼ϑ
[
Q̂µ̂,ν̂(s,a,b)
]
≥ 0,
by definition of µ˜. Hence, (4.47), together with Theorem 3.3, implies that
V ∗ −V µ˜,∗ ≤ 2
∥∥∥Q∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂∥∥∥∞
1−γ = ˜. (4.48)
By similar arguments, we have
V ∗,ν˜ −V ∗ ≤ 2
∥∥∥Q∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂∥∥∥∞
1−γ = ˜. (4.49)
Combining (4.48) and (4.49) yields
V µ˜,ν˜ −V µ˜,∗ ≤ V ∗,ν˜ −V µ˜,∗ ≤ 2˜, V ∗,ν˜ −V µ˜,ν˜ ≤ V ∗,ν˜ −V µ˜,∗ ≤ 2˜,
which completes the proof.
4.5 Proof of Theorem 3.6
We now prove the second main result, Theorem 3.6. First, following the proof of Corollary 3.4, it
suffices to prove that V ∗ −V µ̂,∗ ≤ ˜, V ∗,ν̂ −V ∗ ≤ ˜, since they together imply that (µ̂, ν̂) is a 2˜-Nash
equilibrium. The following analysis is devoted to proving this argument.
The idea is similar to that presented in §4.3, i.e., we use the component-wise error decomposi-
tions in Lemma 4.1, but use (4.4)-(4.5) instead. In particular, letting µ = µ̂ and ν = ν̂, we have
V µ̂,∗ −V ∗ ≥ −‖Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,∗‖∞ − opt − ‖Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗‖∞ (4.50)
V ∗,ν̂ −V ∗ ≤ ‖Q∗,ν̂ − Q̂∗,ν̂‖∞ + opt + ‖Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗‖∞. (4.51)
Note that the bounds for ‖Q̂µ∗,∗ −Q∗‖∞ and ‖Q̂∗,ν∗ −Q∗‖∞ have already been established in Lemma
4.11 (without dependence on opt and the Planning Oracle). It now suffices to bound ‖Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,∗‖∞
and ‖Q∗,ν̂ − Q̂∗,ν̂‖∞. For the former term, by Lemma 4.1, we first have
γ(I −γP̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )V µ̂,ν(µ̂)︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Qµ̂,∗−Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)
≤Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,∗ ≤ γ(I −γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ̂,ν̂(µ̂)︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Qµ̂,ν̂(µ̂)−Q̂µ̂,∗
.
Thus, we know that∥∥∥Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤max{γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ̂,ν̂(µ̂)∥∥∥∞, γ∥∥∥(I −γP̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )V µ̂,ν(µ̂)∥∥∥∞}.
(4.52)
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The first term in the max operator, where the policies in the pair (µ̂, ν̂(µ̂)) are both obtained from the
empirical model Ĝ, can be bounded similarly as that for ‖Qµ̂,ν̂ − Q̂µ̂,ν̂‖∞ in Lemma 4.11. Specifically,
following (4.33)-(4.35), we have
γ
∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ µ̂,∗∥∥∥∞
≤ γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗∥∥∥∞ +γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1(P − P̂ )(V̂ µ̂,∗ − V̂ ∗)∥∥∥∞ (4.53)
≤ γ∥∥∥(I −γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗∣∣∣∥∥∥∞ + 2γopt1−γ , (4.54)
where (4.53) uses triangle inequality, and (4.54) is due to the optimization error of µ̂. Then, to bound
γ
∥∥∥(I − γP µ̂,ν̂(µ̂))−1∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V̂ ∗∣∣∣∥∥∥∞, the rest of the proof is analogous to the derivations in (4.36)-(4.39),
by replacing ν̂ therein by ν̂(µ̂), and bound ‖V̂ µ̂,∗ − V̂ ∗‖∞ by opt. Solving for ‖Qµ̂,ν̂(µ̂) − Q̂µ̂,∗‖∞ yields
the desired bound for the first term in the max in (4.52), namely, there exists some constant c such
that with probability greater than 1− δ,
∥∥∥Qµ̂,ν̂(µ̂) − Q̂µ̂,∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ1−α′δ,N

√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)2N

+
1
1−α′δ,N
· γopt
(1−γ)
1 +
√
log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
N
, (4.55)
where α′δ,N is defined as
α′δ,N =
γ
1−γ
√
2log(8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
N
.
For the second term in the max in (4.52), note that µ̂ is obtained from Ĝ, while ν(µ̂) is obtained
from the true model G. By Lemma 4.10, it holds that
γ
∥∥∥(I −γP̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))−1∣∣∣(P − P̂ )V µ̂,∗∣∣∣∥∥∥∞
≤ γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥(I −γP̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))−1√VarP (V µ̂,∗)∥∥∥∥∞ + γ∆
′
δ,N
1−γ
≤ γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
·
[∥∥∥∥(I −γP̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))−1(√VarP̂ (V̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂)) (4.56)
+
√
VarP̂ (V
µ̂,∗ − V̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))
)∥∥∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥∥(I −γP̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂))−1∣∣∣∣
√
VarP (V µ̂,∗)−
√
VarP̂ (V
µ̂,∗)
∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞
]
+
γ∆′δ,N
1−γ
≤ γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N

√
2
(1−γ)3 +
‖Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)‖∞
1−γ
+ γ∆′δ,N1−γ (4.57)
+
γ
1−γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
∥∥∥∥∣∣∣∣√VarP (V µ̂,∗)−√VarP̂ (V µ̂,∗)∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞,
where (4.56) uses the norm-like triangle-inequality property of
√
VarP (V ) and triangle inequality,
(4.57) is due to Lemma 4.3, and the facts that
√
VarP (X) ≤ ‖X‖∞, ‖V µ̂,∗− V̂ µ̂,ν(µ̂)‖∞ ≤ ‖Qµ̂,∗− Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)‖∞,
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and Lemma 4.2. Moreover, notice that∥∥∥∥∣∣∣∣√VarP (V µ̂,∗)−√VarP̂ (V µ̂,∗)∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ ∥∥∥∥∣∣∣∣
√
VarP (V µ̂,∗)−
√
VarP (V ∗)
∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥∥∣∣∣∣
√
VarP̂ (V
µ̂,∗)−
√
VarP̂ (V
∗)
∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞
+
∥∥∥∥∣∣∣∣√VarP (V ∗)−√VarP̂ (V ∗)∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞ (4.58)
≤
∥∥∥∥√VarP (V µ̂,∗ −V ∗)∥∥∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥∥
√
VarP̂ (V
µ̂,∗ −V ∗)
∥∥∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥∥
√∣∣∣∣VarP (V ∗)−VarP̂ (V ∗)∣∣∣∣∥∥∥∥∞ (4.59)
≤ 2∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V ∗∥∥∥∞ +
√∥∥∥∥VarP (V ∗)−VarP̂ (V ∗)∥∥∥∥∞, (4.60)
where (4.58) uses triangle inequality, (4.59) uses the norm-like triangle inequality of
√
VarP (V ) and√
VarP̂ (V ), and the fact |
√
X −√Y | ≤ √|X −Y | for X,Y ≥ 0, and (4.60) uses √VarP (X) ≤ ‖X‖∞ and the
definition of ‖ · ‖∞. In addition, we know that with probability at least 1− δ,∥∥∥∥VarP (V ∗)−VarP̂ (V ∗)∥∥∥∥∞ = ∥∥∥∥(P − P̂ )(V ∗)2 − ((P V ∗)2 − (P̂ V ∗)2)∥∥∥∥∞
≤
∥∥∥∥(P − P̂ )(V ∗)2∥∥∥∥∞ + ∥∥∥∥(P V ∗)2 − (P̂ V ∗)2∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ 1(1−γ)2
√
2log(2|S||A||B|/δ)
N
+
2
1−γ
∥∥∥(P − P̂ )V ∗∥∥∥∞
≤ 3
(1−γ)2
√
2log(2|S||A||B|/δ)
N
, (4.61)
due to Hoeffding bound and ‖V ∗‖∞ ≤ 1/(1−γ).
Combining (4.57), (4.60), and (4.61) yields
∥∥∥∥Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N

√
2
(1−γ)3 +
‖Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)‖∞
1−γ
+ γ∆′δ,N1−γ
+
γ
1−γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
(
2
∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V ∗∥∥∥∞ +
√
3
(1−γ)2
√
2log(2|S||A||B|/δ)
N
)
.
Solving for ‖Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)‖∞ further leads to∥∥∥Qµ̂,∗ − Q̂µ̂,ν(µ̂)∥∥∥∞
≤ γ
1−α′δ,N

√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)2N

+
1
1−α′δ,N
· γ
1−γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
(
2
∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V ∗∥∥∥∞
+
1
1−γ
4
√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/δ)
N
)
, (4.62)
for some absolute constant c.
Now we substitute (4.55) and (4.62) into (4.52), to complete the bound in (4.50). If the first term
in the max in (4.52) is larger, and noticing that the choice of N in the theorem can make α′δ,N < 1/5,
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(4.50), (4.52), (4.55), and Lemma 4.11 together lead to
V ∗ −V µ̂,∗ ≤ 5γ
2

√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)2N

+
5γopt
2(1−γ) + opt , (4.63)
with some absolute constant c, where we have replaced the term log(1/(1 − γ)2) in the bounds for
‖Q∗ − Q̂µ∗,∗‖∞ and ‖Q∗ − Q̂∗,ν∗‖∞ in Lemma 4.11 (including that in the definition of αδ,N ) by log((C +
1)/(1 − γ)4), a larger number. If the second term in the max in (4.52) is larger, (4.50), (4.52), (4.62),
and Lemma 4.11 together yield
V ∗ −V µ̂,∗ ≤ 5γ
2

√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)3N +
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)2N

+
5
4
· γ
1−γ
√
2log
(
8(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ]
)
N
(
2
∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V ∗∥∥∥∞
+
1
1−γ
4
√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/δ)
N
)
+ opt ,
where we have used the fact that α′δ,N < 1/5. Taking infinity norm on both sides and solving for
‖V µ̂,∗ −V ∗‖∞, we have
V ∗ −V µ̂,∗ ≤ ∥∥∥V µ̂,∗ −V ∗∥∥∥∞ ≤ 5γ

√
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)3N + (4.64)
c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/[(1−γ)4δ])
(1−γ)2N
+ 5γ2(1−γ)2 (c log(c(C + 1)|S||A||B|/δ)N )3/4 + 2opt ,
with some absolute constant c (which can be different from that in (4.63)). Using the choice of N in
the theorem, and combining (4.63) and (4.64), we finally have V ∗ −V µ̂,∗ ≤ + 4opt/(1−γ). Note that
on the right-hand side of (4.64), the N that makes the third term to be O() is O˜(1/[(1 − γ)8/34/3]),
which is dominated by O˜(1/[(1 − γ)32]) when  ∈ (0,1/(1 − γ)1/2]. In addition, to make α′δ,N < 1/5,
N should be larger than O˜(1/(1−γ)2), which is consistent with both the first and third terms on the
right-hand side of (4.64) to be O˜(1/(1−γ)1/2), determining the allowed range of  to be (0,1/(1−γ)1/2].
This proves the first bound in the theorem.
The proof for completing the bound in (4.51) is analogous: using Lemmas 4.10 and 4.1 to bound
‖Q∗,ν̂ − Q̂∗,ν̂‖∞, which is then substituted into (4.51). This completes the proof.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have established the first (near-)minimax optimal sample complexity for model-
based MARL, when a generative model is available. Our setting was focused on the basic model
in MARL — infinite-horizon zero-sum discounted Markov games (Littman, 1994). By noticing that
reward is not used in the sampling process of this model-based approach, we have separated the
reward-aware and reward-agnostic cases, and established sample complexity lower bounds corre-
spondingly, a unique separation in the multi-agent context. We have then shown that this simple
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model-based approach is near-minimax optimal in the reward-aware case, with only a gap in the
dependence on |A|, |B|; and is indeed minimax-optimal in the reward-agnostic case. This separation
and the (near-)optimal results have not only justified the sample-efficiency of this simple approach,
but also reflected both its power (easily handling multiple reward functions known in hindsight),
and its limitation (less adaptive and can hardly achieve the optimal O˜(|A|+ |B|)). We believe that our
results may shed light on the choice of model-free and model-based approaches in various MARL
scenarios in practice.
Our results naturally open up the following interesting future directions. First, besides the turn-
based setting in Sidford et al. (2019) and the episodic setting in the concurrent work Bai et al. (2020),
the minimax-optimal sample complexity in all parameters for model-free algorithms is still open. As
discussed §3, in the reward-aware case, the Ω˜(|A| + |B|) lower bound may only be attainable by
model-free ones. It would be interesting to compare the results with our model-based ones, in both
reward-aware and reward-agnostic cases, to better understand their pros and cons in various MARL
settings. It would also be interesting to explore the (near-)optimal sample complexity or regret of
model-based approaches in other MARL scenarios, such as when no generative model is available,
episodic and average-reward settings, general-sum Markov games, and the setting with function
approximation.
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A Lower Bounds
Now we discuss lower bounds of the sample complexity given in §3.1.
A.1 Reward-Aware Case
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The proof follows by recalling the hard cases of MDPs considered in Azar
et al. (2013) or Feng et al. (2019), and replacing each action a therein by a joint-action (a,b). Without
loss of generality, suppose |A| ≥ |B|. Then, we design a Markov game such that agent 2 has no effect
on the reward or the transition. Thus, finding an NE is now the same as agent 1 finding the optimal
value/policy. By the arguments in Azar et al. (2013); Feng et al. (2019), the sample complexity is at
least Ω˜
(
|S| ·max{|A|, |B|} · (1 − γ)−3−2
)
, where Ω˜ suppresses some log factors of |S|, |A|, |B| and 1/δ.
Noticing that max{|A|, |B|} = (|A|+ |B|+ ∣∣∣|A| − |B|∣∣∣)/2, we obtain the lower bound.
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Challenge in Obtaining Ω˜(|A||B|). Note that the proof of a Ω˜
(
|S|(|A| + |B|) · (1 − γ)−3−2
)
lower
bound is a straightforward adaptation from the single-agent result. The lower bound can also be
obtained in several other ways (via a treatment of turn-based Markov games, or the attempts to be
introduced next). Nevertheless, these attempts can hardly lead to a lower bound of Ω˜(|A||B|), in this
reward-aware case. We highlight the challenges as follows.
The core proof idea of Azar et al. (2013); Feng et al. (2019) for the single-agent setting lower
bound is to create a class of O(|S||A|) number of MDPs, which are hard to distinguish from each
other. When the reward function is given (i.e. in the reward-aware setting), one can only change
the transition model to obtain different hard MDPs. Hence, in Azar et al. (2013), their approach is
to first create a null hypothesis, in which the optimal Q-value and -optimal actions at every state
are fixed. Then in each of the O(|S||A|) alternative hypothesis, they change the transition probability
of a distinct state-action pair (s,a) in the null case to make the Q-value slightly differ from the
null-setting and such that a is an -optimal action at state s. They construct the hard instance
cleverly such that if an algorithm correctly outputs the optimal Q-value (or optimal policy) in an
alternative hypothesis with high probability, then it must have sampled Ω˜((1 − γ)−3−2) samples
at the corresponding (s,a) pair in the null hypothesis. As this holds for all O(|S||A|) alternative
hypotheses, we obtain an Ω˜(|S||A|(1−γ)−3−2) sample lower bound.
In the game setting, however, the above idea requires to change the Nash equilibrium (say, a
unique pure strategy) to a different state-action-action tuple at any state while only make changes
to the probability transition of the corresponding state-joint-action tuple. Nevertheless, this is chal-
lenging to achieve in general, as the NE value of zero-sum matrix games is not sensitive to the small
number of element changes in the payoff matrices. This can be evidenced either by the stability of
the NE in this case against the payoff perturbation (Jansen, 1981), or by the sensitivity analysis of the
equivalent linear program of the game (Luce and Raiffa, 1989) against the problem data (Dantzig,
1998). Indeed, one can verify that only changing O(1) elements in the transition probability ma-
trix, and thus changing O(1) elements in the Q-value table at each state, by a small amount, can
hardly change the NE value/policy too much. Some order of O(|A|) (or O(|B|)) number of changes
may suffice, but will eventually yields O(|B|) (or O(|A|)) hard alternative cases, leading to the same
Ω˜(|A| + |B|) result as Lemma 3.1. In other words, one can hardly obtain the sufficient number of
required hard cases (Ω˜(|A||B|)) by changing only O(1) elements in the transition probability matrix.
On the other hand, interestingly, we note that there are some results on the payoff query complex-
ity, i.e., the number of queries for the elements in the payoff matrix, for finding the NE (Fearnley
et al., 2015; Fearnley and Savani, 2016). It is possible to use O(k log(k)/2) queries to find the -NE in
zero-sum matrix games when |A| = |B|, where k = |A| = |B| (Fearnley and Savani, 2016). Note that the
lower bound given in Fearnley and Savani (2016), though being Ω(k2), requires the accuracy  ≤ 1/k
to be small, which cannot be used in our previous analysis with a dimension-free choice of . From
a different angle, these results imply that it may indeed be unnecessary to accurately estimate all
elements in the matrix, in order to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium.
In light of these observations, we have conjectured that with reward knowledge, the lower bound
of Ω˜(|A|+ |B|) is indeed unimprovable, which might be matched by some other (possibly model-free)
MARL algorithms, as general model-based approaches inherently require Ω˜(|A||B|) for transition
model estimation. Such a Ω˜(|A|+ |B|) lower bound on regret has been provided recently in Bai and
Jin (2020), though in a different setting. More interestingly, though not entirely comparable to us, in
the concurrent work Bai et al. (2020), the O˜(|A|+|B|) complexity is indeed shown to be attainable by a
model-free Nash-V learning algorithm in the episodic setting, with the reward information guiding
the online update.
33
1- 1- 1-…
…
1-1- …
…
…
…
…
Figure 1: The class of zero-sum Markov games G considered in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Circles
denote the states and arrows denote the transitions. White, yellow, and blue circles denote the three
disjoint subsets of states X , Y1, and Y2, respectively.
A.2 Reward-Agnostic Case
Now we establish the lower bound for the reward-agnostic case, i.e., the proof of Theorem 3.2.
The idea to construct hard cases is similar to that discussed in §A.1, which is motivated by Azar
et al. (2013); Feng et al. (2019), but with additional flexibility to design the reward function that
is unknown in the sampling stage. Our hard cases apply to both finding the -NE policy pair and
finding the -approximate NE value. For the sake of presentation, we focus on proving the lower
bound for the -NE policy. Let us first formally define the notion of a correct algorithm in terms of
learning an -NE policy in this reward-agnostic case.
Definition A.1. ((,δ)-correct reward-agnostic algorithm) We say that an RL algorithm A is (,δ)-
correct in the reward-agnostic case, if for any unknown MG G = (S ,A,B, r,P ,γ), A first calls a gen-
erative model on (S ,A,B, P ,γ), and is then fed with the reward r, and outputs an -NE policy (µ,ν)
with probability at least 1− δ.
Note that r is only revealed to A after the sampling, and such an A should be able to output
an (,δ)-correct NE policy for any single r in the underlying model. Thus, for M reward functions
defined over the same (S ,A,B, P ,γ), using a union bound argument, the -NE policy corresponding
to all M reward functions can be obtained simultaneously with probability greater than 1−Mδ (of
course with a small enough δ). To prove the theorem, we will construct a class of Markov game
models. We show that if algorithm A only draws samples much fewer than the lower bound, there
exists an MG G such that A cannot be an (,δ)-correct reward-agnostic algorithm for.
Construction of the Hard Case We define a family of MGs G. See illustrations in Figure 1. The
state space S consists of three disjoint subsetsX , Y1, andY2. The setX includesK states {x1,x2, . . . ,xK }
and each of them has L1 > 1 available max-player actions {a1, a2, . . . , aL1} =:A, and L2 > 1 min-player
actions {b1,b2, . . . , bL2} =: B. Each state in Y1 := {y1,x,a,b : ∀x ∈ X , a ∈ A,b ∈ B} and Y2 := {y2,x,a,b : ∀x ∈X , a ∈ A,b ∈ B} only has a single joint-action pair to choose. In total, there are N := 3KL1L2 state-
joint-action pairs. For state x ∈ X , by taking a joint-action (a,b) for a ∈ A,b ∈ B, it transitions to a
state y1,x,a,b ∈ Y1 with probability 1. For state y1,x,a,b ∈ Y1, there is only a single joint-action for both
players to choose from, which is the (a,b) pair that leads to this y1,x,a,b. It then transitions to itself
with probability pG,x,a,b ∈ (1/2,1) and to a corresponding state y2,x,a,b ∈ Y2 with probability 1−pG,x,a,b.
Note that pG,x,a,b can be different for different state-joint-action tuples. All states in Y2 are absorbing.
The reward function is: for any y1,x,a,b ∈ Y1, R(y1,x,a,b) = ιG,x,a,b for some ιG,x,a,b ∈ [0,1] (to be specified
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later); and for all other states, R(s) = 0. And the Q-function of the MGs can be computed as
QG(x,a,b) =
γιG,x,a,b
1−γpG,x,a,b , ∀ (x,a,b) ∈ X ×A×B, (A.1)
which is fully characterized by pG,x,a,b and ιG,x,a,b.
Transition Model Hypotheses of G We restrict γ ∈ (1/2,1). Let p0 = γ and α1,α2 ∈ (0,1). We
consider M + 1 possibilities of the transition models of G, where M := K[L1(L2 − 1)] — the null
hypothesis is:
G1 :

pG1,xk ,a1,b1 = p0 −α1, ∀ k ∈ [K],
pG1,xk ,al ,b1 = p0 − 2α1, ∀ k ∈ [K], l ∈ [L1]\{1},
pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 = p0, ∀ k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], l2 , 1;
(A.2)
and for all k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1} the M alternative hypotheses are:
Gk,l1,l2 :

pGk,l1 ,l2 ,xk ,al1 ,bl2 = pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 −α2 = p0 −α2,
pGk,l1 ,l2 ,xk ,al′1 ,bl2 = pG1,xk ,al′1 ,bl2 = p0, ∀l
′
1 , l1,
pGk,l1 ,l2 ,xk′ ,al′1 ,bl′2 = pG1,xk′ ,al′1 ,bl′2 , ∀(k
′ , l′1, l′2) , (k, l1, l2),
(A.3)
where α1 = c′(1 − γp0)2/γ , α2 = c(1 − γp0)2/γ for some  ∈ (0,1) and absolute constants c′ , c > 0
to be determined later. Note that each alternative hypothesis only has one element in the transition
model different from the null one.
Reward Functions We define a class of M + 1 reward functions R = {r1}⋃{rk,l1,l2 : ∀k ∈ [K], l1 ∈
[L1], l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}}, which is unknown to A during sampling, and is defined as follows (recall that
other than the value specified by ιG,x,a,b, rewards are all zero):
r1 :

ιG,xk ,a1,b1 = 1, ∀ k ∈ [K],
ιG,xk ,al ,b1 = 1, ∀ k ∈ [K], l ∈ [L1]\{1},
ιG,xk ,al1 ,bl2 = 1, ∀ k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], l2 , 1;
rk,l1,l2 :

ιG,xk ,al1 ,bl2 = 1,
ιG,xk ,al′1 ,bl2 =
1−γpG1 ,xk ,al′1 ,bl2
1−γ
(
pG1 ,xk ,al′1
,bl2
−2α2
) , ∀l′1 , l1,
ιG,xk′ ,al′1 ,bl′2 = 1, ∀(k
′ , l′1, l′2) , (k, l1, l2),
for all k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}.
By the construction above, if the reward function rm ∈R is assigned to the corresponding transi-
tion model in Gm, for either m = 1 or any m = (k, l1, l2), then the corresponding Q-values become
for G1 :

QG1(xk , a1,b1) =
γ
1−γ(p0−α1) , ∀ k ∈ [K],
QG1(xk , al ,b1) =
γ
1−γ(p0−2α1) , ∀ k ∈ [K], l ∈ [L1]\{1},
QG1(xk , al1 ,bl2 ) =
γ
1−γp0 , ∀ k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], l2 , 1;
(A.4)
∀k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], l2 ∈ [L2]\{1} for Gk,l1,l2 :

QGk,l1 ,l2 (xk , al1 ,bl2 ) =
γ
1−γ
(
pG1 ,xk ,al1 ,bl2 −α2
) ,
QGk,l1 ,l2 (xk , al′1 ,bl2 ) =
γ
1−γ
(
pG1 ,xk ,al′1
,bl2
−2α2
) , ∀l′1 , l1,
QGk,l1 ,l2 (xk′ , al′1 ,bl′2 ) =
γ
1−γpG1 ,xk′ ,al′1 ,bl′2
, ∀(k′ , l′1, l′2) , (k, l1, l2).
(A.5)
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We then select α1 such that for (l1, l2) , (1,1),∣∣∣QG1(xk , a1,b1)−QG1(xk , al1 ,bl2)∣∣∣
≥min
( γ
1−γp0 −
γ
1−γ(p0 −α1) ,
γ
1−γ(p0 −α1) −
γ
1−γ(p0 − 2α1)
)
≥ 20 (A.6)
and α2 is selected such that α2 ≥ 2α1 and
48 ≥ |QGk,l1 ,l2 (xk , al1 ,bl2)−QGk,l1 ,l2 (xk , al′1 ,bl′2)| ≥ 20 (A.7)
for all (l′1, l′2) , (l1, l2). Moreover, we require that p0 ∈ (1/2 + 2α1 + 2α2,1), α2/(1 − p0) ∈ (0,1/2) and
α2/(p0 − 2α1 − 2α2) ∈ (0,1/2). Hence,  ≤ O(1/(1−γ)).
In the sequel, we denote E1 and P1 to measure the expectation and probability of an event under
the transition model hypothesis G1. Similarly, we denote Ek,l1,l2 and Pk,l1,l2 to measure the expectation
and probability of an event under hypothesis Gk,l1,l2 . It is not hard to verify that in the above case
(with rm being assigned to Gm correspondingly, form = 1 orm = (k, l1, l2)), there is a unique NE policy
pair under hypothesis G1: for x ∈ X , µ∗1(x) = a1 and ν∗1(x) = b1; and that there is a unique NE policy
under hypothesis Gk,l1,l2 for all l1 ∈ [L1] and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}: for k′ , k, µ∗k,l1,l2(xk′ ) = a1, ν∗k,l1,l2(xk′ ) = b1,
and µ∗k,l1,l2(xk) = al1 , ν
∗
k,l1,l2
(xk) = bl2 .
Moreover, one can verify that if any reward rk,l1,l2 with k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1} (instead
of r1 as in (A.4)) is assigned to the transition model of G1, then the NE policy at xk can never be
the pure strategy µ∗1(xk) = al1 , ν
∗
1(xk) = bl2 (it can be some mixed NE policy). As a consequence, for
algorithmA, after estimating the transition model of G1, if rk,l1,l2 is revealed, then it will output some
-NE policy with probability greater than 1−δ; this -NE policy pair, which can be mixed strategies
at xk , should output the joint-action (al1 ,bl2) with a small probability, which is smaller than
β :=
γ
1−γ(p0−α1) −
γ
1−γ(p0−2α2) + 
γ
1−γp0 −
γ
1−γ(p0−2α2)
= 1−
γ
1−γp0 −
γ
1−γ(p0−α1) − 
γ
1−γp0 −
γ
1−γ(p0−2α2)
≤ 1− 19
96
≤ 1− 19(1−γp0)
γ
, (A.8)
(implying that  ≤ γ/[96(1− γp0)]), where the first inequality is due to (A.6)-(A.7), and the last one
follows by upper-bounding γ/(1−γp0) − γ/[1−γ(p0 − 2α2)] simply by γ/(1−γp0). This is because
otherwise, the value of the -NE policy at xk , denoted by V ∗G1(xk) satisfies
V ∗G1(xk) ≥ β ·
γ
1−γp0 + (1− β) ·
γ
1−γ(p0 − 2α2) =
γ
1−γ(p0 −α1) + , (A.9)
where the first inequality is because with reward rk,l1,l2 being assigned to model G1, at state xk and
with the joint-action (al1 ,bl2), the Q-value is γ/(1−γp0), while the smallest Q-value at state xk is
γ/[1−γ(p0 − 2α2)]; the last equation is due to the definition of β in (A.8). However, one can verify
that the NE-value in this case lies in [γ/(1−γ(p0 − 2α1)),γ/(1−γ(p0 −α1))], by finding the minimax
and maximin elements in the payoff matrix, i.e., the Q-value table at xk (using Lemma B.2). Thus,
(A.9) contradicts the fact that this policy is an -NE policy (thus making V ∗G1(xk) -close to the NE-
value). If we define the following events for every k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}:
Bk,l1,l2 =
{
when fed with rk,l1,l2 ∈R, A outputs (µ,ν) such that at xk ,
(
al1 ,bl2
)
is generated w.p. ≤ β
}
, (A.10)
then the above argument can be written as P1
(
Bk,l1,l2
)
≥ 1− δ.
Now, we fix  ∈ (0,0) and δ ∈ (0,δ0), where 0 and δ0 will be determined later. Let
t∗ = c1
(1−γ)32 log
( 1
4δ
)
,
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where c1 > 0 is an absolute constant to be determined later. We also define Tk,l1,l2 to be the num-
ber of samples that algorithm A calls from the generative model with input state y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 till
A stops (these sample calls are not necessarily consecutive). Note that no reward information is
used/revealed to the agent in this sampling process ofA. For every k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1},
we define the following two events:
Ak,l1,l2 = {Tk,l1,l2 ≤ 4t∗}, (A.11)
Ck,l1,l2 =
{
Sk,l1,l2 − pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2Tk,l1,l2 ≤
√
2pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 (1− pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 )Tk,l1,l2 log(1/4δ)
}
, (A.12)
where Sk,l1,l2 is the number of transitions to itself in the Tk,l1,l2 calls to the generative model with
input state y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 . For these events, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma A.2. For any k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}, if E1[Tk,l1,l2] ≤ t∗, P1(Ak,l1,l2) > 3/4.
Proof. Notice that
t∗ ≥ E1[Tk,l1,l2] > 4t∗P1(Tk,l1,l2 > 4t∗) = 4t∗(1−P1(Tk,l1,l2 ≤ 4t∗)).
Thus, P1(Ak,l1,l2) > 3/4.
Lemma A.3. For any k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}, if δ < 1/16, P1(Ck,l1,l2) ≥ 3/4.
Proof. We denote outcome to be 1 if the transition from y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 ends up on itself; otherwise 0. By
definition, the outcomes from state y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 are i.i.d. Bernoulli-pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 random variables. Let
 :=
√
2pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 (1− pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 )Tk,l1,l2 log(1/4δ). By Chernoff-Hoeffding bound and pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 ≥
p0 − 2α1 > 1/2, we have that
P1
(
Sk,l − pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2Tk,l1,l2 ≤ 
)
≥ 1− exp
(
−KL
(
pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 +

Tk,l1,l2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2
)
· Tk,l1,l2
)
≥ 1− exp
(
− 
2
2pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 (1− pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 )Tk,l1,l2
)
≥ 1− 4δ. (A.13)
Additional application of δ < 1/16 proves the lemma.
Let δ0 = 1/16 and 0 = γ/[96(1−γp0)]. Then, for δ ∈ (0,δ0) and  ∈ (0,0), and with the transition
model of G1 being input, by the argument after (A.10), we have P1(Bk,l1,l2) ≥ 1−δ ≥ 1−1/16 ≥ 3/4, for
all k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}. Define the event Ek,l1,l2 := Ak,l1,l2 ∩Bk,l1,l2 ∩Ck,l1,l2 . Combining
Lemmas A.2 and A.3 and P1(Bk,l1,l2) ≥ 3/4, we have that
P1(Ek,l1,l2) > (3/4)3 > 1/4, ∀ k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}, (A.14)
if E1[Tk,l1,l2] ≤ t∗, δ ∈ (0,δ0) and  ∈ (0,0). Next, we show that if the expectation of the number of
samples in A on any y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 is no greater than t
∗ under the hypothesis G1, then Bk,l1,l2 occurs with
probability greater than δ under the hypothesis Gk,l1,l2 .
Lemma A.4. Let 0 = min
{
γ
96(1−γp0) , c
′′min
{
γ
(1−γp0)2 ,
1
1−γ
}}
for some constant c′′ > 0. For any k ∈ [K],
l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}, when  ∈ (0,0), if E1[Tk,l1,l2] ≤ t∗, then Pk,l1,l2(Bk,l1,l2) ≥ δ.
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Proof. LetW be the length-Tk,l1,l2 random sequence of the next states by calling the generative model
Tk,l1,l2 times with the input state y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 . To simplify notation, we representW as a binary sequence
where 1 represents the next state from y1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 to itself and 0 otherwise. If (l1, l2) , (1,1) and G = G1,
W forms an i.i.d. Bernoulli-pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 sequence; if G = Gk,l1,l2 , this is an i.i.d Bernoulli-pGk,l1 ,l2 ,xk ,al1 ,bl2
sequence. We define the likelihood function Lk,l1,l2 as
∀w ∈ {0,1}Tk,l1 ,l2 : Lk,l1,l2(w) = Pk,l1,l2[W = w] and L1(w) = P1[W = w].
Recall that the notation Sk,l1,l2 denotes the total number of 1’s in W . For convenience, let us denote
p1 = pG1,xk ,al1 ,bl2 , and p2 = pGk,l1 ,l2 ,xk ,al1 ,bl2 .
Note that
p1 − p2 = α2.
To additionally simplify the notation, we define T = Tk,l1,l2 and S = Sk,l1,l2 . With these new notations,
we compute Lk,l1,l2(W )/L1(W ) as follows
Lk,l1,l2(W )
L1(W ) =
(p2)S(1− p2)T−S
(p1)S(1− p1)T−S
=
(
1 +
α2
p1
)S (
1− α2
1− p1
)T−S
=
(
1 +
α2
p1
)S (
1− α2
1− p1
)S 1−p1p1 (
1− α2
1− p1
)T−S/p1
. (A.15)
Note that p0 − 2α1 ≤ p1 ≤ p0. By our choice of p0, α1, α2, and , it holds that α2/(1 − p1) ∈ (0,1/2)
and α2/p1 ∈ (0,1/2). With the fact that log(1 − u) ≥ −u − u2 for u ∈ [0,1/2] and exp(−u) ≥ 1 − u for
u ∈ [0,1], we have that(
1− α2
1− p1
) 1−p1
p1 ≥ exp
(
1− p1
p1
(
− α2
1− p1 −
( α2
1− p1
)2)) ≥ (1− α2
p1
)(
1− α
2
2
p1(1− p1)
)
. (A.16)
Thus
Lk,l1,l2(W )
L1(W ) ≥
(
1− α
2
2
p21
)S (
1− α
2
2
p1(1− p1)
)S (
1− α2
1− p1
)T−S/p1
(A.17)
≥
(
1− α
2
2
p21
)T (
1− α
2
2
p1(1− p1)
)T (
1− α2
1− p1
)T−S/p1
(A.18)
due to S ≤ T . Next, we proceed on the event Ek,l1,l2 . By definition, if Ek,l1,l2 occurs, event Ak,l1,l2 has
occurred. Using log(1−u) ≥ −2u for u ∈ [0,1/2], it follows that(
1− α
2
2
p21
)T
≥
(
1− α
2
2
p21
)4t∗
≥ exp
(
−8t∗α
2
2
p21
)
≥ (4δ)128c2c1 ,
where we use the fact that
t∗ · α
2
2
p21
=
c1
(1−γ)32 log
( 1
4δ
)
· c
2(1−γp0)42
γ2p21
≤ c1
(1−γ)3 log
( 1
4δ
)
· c
2(1−γp0)4
γ2p21
≤ 16c1c2(1−γ) · log(1/4δ).
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Using log(1−u) ≥ −2u for u ∈ [0,1/2], we also have that(
1− α
2
2
p1(1− p1)
)T
≥
(
1− α
2
2
p1(1− p1)
)4t∗
≥ exp
(
−8t∗ α
2
2
p1(1− p1)
)
≥ (4δ)64c2c1 ,
where we use
t∗ · α
2
2
p1(1− p1) =
c1
(1−γ)32 log
( 1
4δ
)
· c
2(1−γp0)42
γ2p1(1− p1)
≤ c1
(1−γ)3 log
( 1
4δ
)
· c
2(1−γp0)4
γ2(p1)(1− p0) ≤ 8c1c
2 · log(1/4δ).
Further, we have that when Ek,l1,l2 occurs, Ck,l1,l2 also occurs. Therefore,(
1− α2
1− p1
)T−S/p1
≥
(
1− α2
1− p1
)√ 1−p1
p1
T log(1/4δ)
≥
(
1− α2
1− p1
)√ 1−p1
p1
4t∗ log(1/4δ)
≥ exp
−
√
16
α22
p1(1− p1) t
∗ log(1/4δ)
 ≥ (4δ)√16c1c2 .
By taking c1 small enough, e.g., c1 = 10−5c−2, we have Lk,l1,l2(W )/L1(W ) ≥ 4δ. Note that by (A.3),
the probability measure of the whole sample sequence under the two hypotheses G1 and Gk,l1,l2 only
differ at (k, l1, l2). By a change of measure, we deduce that
Pk,l1,l2(Bk,l1,l2) ≥ Pk,l1,l2(Ek,l1,l2) = Ek,l1,l2[1Ek,l1 ,l2 ] = E1
[Lk,l1,l2(W )
L1(W ) 1Ek,l1 ,l2
]
≥ 4δ · 1/4 = δ, (A.19)
which completes the proof.
IfA is an (,δ)-correct reward-agnostic algorithm, then under transition model hypothesis Gk,l1,l2 ,
when fed with rk,l1,l2 , it produces an -NE policy pair (µ,ν) with probability at least 1 − δ. At state
xk , this -NE policy should generate the joint-action (al1 ,bl2) with a high probability. To see this,
note that now (al1 ,bl2) is the unique NE strategy at state xk , which is a pure strategy. By Lemma B.3,
(µ(· |xk),1b=bl2 ) is an 2-NE strategy at xk . Let ζ ∈ [0,1] denote the probability of choosing al1 , i.e.,
ζ = µ(al1 |xk). Then, the value at xk under (µ(· |xk),1b=bl2 ), denoted by Vµ,bl2 (xk), is
Vµ,bl2 (xk) = ζ ·
γ
1−γ(p0 −α2) + (1− ζ) ·
γ
1−γ(p0 − 2α2) ≤
γ
1−γ(p0 −α2) ,
which, by the 2-NE property, should satisfy
Vµ,bl2 (xk) ≥
γ
1−γ(p0 −α2) − 2 =⇒ ζ ≥ 1−
2
γ
1−γ(p0−α2) −
γ
1−γ(p0−2α2)
≥ 1− 2
20
=
9
10
.
Similarly, let ξ = ν(bl2 |xk), we have
Val1 ,ν(xk) ≥ ξ ·
γ
1−γ(p0 −α2) + (1− ξ) ·
[ γ
1−γ(p0 −α2) + 20
]
=
γ
1−γ(p0 −α2) + 20(1− ξ),
where the inequality is due to (A.7). As (1a=al1 ,ν(· |xk)) is an 2-NE at xk , we have Val1 ,ν(xk) ≤
γ/[1−γ(p0 −α2)] + 2, leading to ξ ≥ 9/10. Thus, for the -NE (µ,ν), the probability of generat-
ing (al1 ,bl2) is at least ζ · ξ ≥ 81/100.
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Hence, recalling the definition in (A.10) and the fact that β ≤ 1 − 19/96 < 81/100, we have
Pk,l1,l2
(
Bk,l1,l2
)
< δ for all k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}. From Lemma A.4, this does not hap-
pen unless E1[Tk,l1,l2] > t
∗ for all k ∈ [K], l1 ∈ [L1], and l2 ∈ [L2]\{1}. By linearity of expectation,
the expected number of samples required by A under hypothesis G1 is at least K[L1(L2 − 1)]t∗ =
Ω
(
N
(1−γ)32 log(1/δ)
)
, which proves the lower bound for finding the -NE policy.
On the lower bound for finding -approximate NE value, the hard cases above can also be used.
In fact, suppose some algorithmA returns some Q̂ such that ‖Q̂−Q∗‖∞ ≤ /4 with probability at least
1−δ, then it can identify the pure NE strategy as described in the paragraph before (A.10) for the Q-
values given in (A.4)-(A.5) (when reward rm is assigned to transition model of Gm correspondingly),
under our choices of the parameters. This can be done by solving for the NE of the corresponding
Q̂. Moreover, when rk,l1,l2 is assigned to G1 (instead of r1 as in (A.4)), this procedure of solving the
NE policy for Q̂ will also output some policy that makes Bk,l1,l2 in (A.10) hold with P1(Bk,l1,l2) ≥ 1−δ,
following similar arguments around (A.9). Indeed, otherwise, if this procedure outputs µ(xk) =
al1 ,ν(xk) = bl2 with a high probability, then the NE value under payoff matrix Q̂(xk , ·, ·) will be at
least /2 away from the NE value under payoff matrix Q∗(xk , ·, ·), due to our choice of α1. However,
as one-step of the maxmin operation onto Q̂(xk , ·, ·) (and Q∗(xk , ·, ·)) is non-expansive, the NE values
under these two payoff matrices should differ no greater than /4, as ‖Q̂ −Q∗‖∞ ≤ /4. This shows
P1(Bk,l1,l2) ≥ 1− δ. Then, using almost identical arguments as above, we obtain a lower bound of the
same order, and thus prove Theorem 3.2.
B Auxiliary Results
B.1 A Smooth Planning Oracle
We now show that solving the regularized matrix game induced by Q̂∗, see (3.2), leads to a smooth
Planning Oracle (see Definition 3.5).
Lemma B.1. Suppose that the regularizers Ωi for i = 1,2 in (3.2) are twice continuously differen-
tiable and strongly convex. Suppose that the solution policy pair (µ̂(· |s), ν̂(· |s)) of (3.2) lies in the
relative interior of the simplexes ∆(A) and ∆(B), respectively. Then, (µ̂, ν̂) is smooth with respect to
Q̂∗, namely, this Planning Oracle follows Definition 3.5 with some constant C.
Proof. Let Qs := Q̂∗(s, ·, ·) ∈ R|A|×|B| denote the payoff matrix of the game at state s. Note that Qs ∈
[0, (1−γ)−1]|A|×|B|, u ∈ [0,1]|A| and ϑ ∈ [0,1]|B|. First, as the solution to (3.2) lies in the relative interior
of the simplex, by first-order optimality, we have that for each s ∈ S
∇uΩ1(u)−Qsϑ = 0, ∇ϑΩ2(ϑ) +Q>s u = 0, (B.1)
whose solution is unique. Define a function F : R|A| ×R|B| ×R|A||B| → R|A|+|B| as follows, such that
(B.1) is equivalent to
F
(
u,ϑ,vec(Qs)
)
:=
[∇uΩ1(u)−Qsϑ
∇ϑΩ2(ϑ) +Q>s u
]
= 0.
As the solution to (B.1) lies in the relative interior of ∆(A) × ∆(B), for any choice of Qs ∈ R|A|×|B|
(not just [0, (1−γ)−1]|A|×|B|), the domain of F can be specified as ∆o(A)×∆o(B)×Λ, where ∆o(A) and
∆o(B) denote the interiors of ∆(A) and ∆(B), respectively, and Λ ⊂ R|A||B| denotes some open set that
contains [0, (1−γ)−1]|A||B|.
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Notice that the Jacobian of F with respect to [u> ϑ>]> is
M
(
u,ϑ,vec(Qs)
)
:=
[
∂F
∂u
∂F
∂ϑ
]
=
[∇2uΩ1(u) −Qs
Q>s ∇2ϑΩ2(ϑ)
]
, (B.2)
which is always invertible for any point in ∆o(A)×∆o(B)×Λ. This is because Ωi are strongly convex,
and thus the real parts of the eigenvalues of the matrix, which are the eigenvalues of (M+M>)/2, are
always positive and uniformly lower bounded, namely, there exists some constant η > 0, such that
min
i
λi
(
M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs)) +M
>(u,ϑ,vec(Qs))
)
≥ 2η > 0,
with λi(·) being the eigenvalues of the corresponding matrix. This further implies that for any
(u,ϑ,vec(Qs)) ∈ ∆o(A)×∆o(B)×Λ,∥∥∥M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs))−1∥∥∥2 = 1mini σi(M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs))) ≤ 2mini λi(M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs)) +M>(u,ϑ,vec(Qs))) ≤ 1η ,
where σi is the singular value of M.
By the implicit function theorem (Krantz and Parks, 2012), for any point that solves F(u,ϑ,Qs) =
0, since M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs)) is invertible, there exists a neighborhood U ⊆ ∆o(A), V ⊆ ∆o(B), and W ⊆Λ
around it, such that [u> ϑ>]> ∈U ×V is a unique function of vec(Qs) for all vec(Qs) ∈W , and
∂[u> v>]>
∂vec(Qs)
= −
[
∂F
∂u
∂F
∂ϑ
]−1 · ∂F
∂vec(Qs)
= −M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs))−1 ·

−ϑ> ⊗ e1
...
−ϑ> ⊗ e|A|
u> 0 · · · 0
. . .
0 0 · · · u>

,
where ei ∈ R|B| is an all-zero vector except that the i-th element is 1. Thus, we have∥∥∥∥∥∂[u> v>]>∂vec(Qs)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ∥∥∥M(u,ϑ,vec(Qs))−1∥∥∥2 · ∥∥∥∥∥ ∂F∂vec(Qs)
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤ |A||B|
η
·
∥∥∥∥∥ ∂F∂vec(Qs)
∥∥∥∥∥
1
=
|A||B|
η
.
Notice that this is a uniform bound on the gradient of the implicit function, at any point in ∆o(A)×
∆o(B)×Λ, which together with the mean-value theorem leads to∥∥∥[u>1 v>1 ]− [u>2 v>2 ]∥∥∥2 ≤ |A||B|η · ∥∥∥vec(Qs,1)− vec(Qs,2)∥∥∥2,
where the pair (ui ,ϑi) is the unique solution of F = 0 corresponding to Qs,i . By the equivalence of
norms and considering all s ∈ S , we can find some constant C (which may depend on |A| and |B|
polynomially) as the smooth coefficient, and this completes the proof.
To ensure that the solution (µ̂(· |s), ν̂(· |s)) of (3.2) lies in the relative interior of the simplexes, the
common choice of steep regularizers will suffice (Mertikopoulos and Sandholm, 2016). The steep
regularizer means that for any u (resp. ϑ) on the boundary of the simplex ∆(A) (resp. ∆(B)), and
for every interior sequence un→ u (resp. ϑn→ ϑ) that approaches it, it holds that
∥∥∥dΩ1(u)
du
∣∣∣
u=un
∥∥∥
2
→
∞ (resp. ∥∥∥dΩ2(ϑ)dϑ ∣∣∣ϑ=ϑn∥∥∥2 → ∞). This way, the optimizer is not on the boundary of the simplexes.
Examples of steep regularizers in Lemma B.1 include the commonly used negative entropy, Tsallis
entropy and Re´nyi entropy with certain parameters; see Mertikopoulos and Sandholm (2016) for
more discussions.
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B.2 Properties of (-)NE in Zero-Sum Matrix Games
Now we establish several properties of the (-)NE strategies in zero-sum matrix games, which have
been used in the proof in §A.2.
Lemma B.2 (NE Value Range). Consider a two-player zero-sum matrix game M with the action
spaces A and B, and the payoff matrix M ∈ R|A|×|B| with = {mij}i∈[|A|],j∈[|B|] for the maximizer (agent-
1). Then, the NE value of the game V ∗ is bounded between the maximin and minimax elements in
M, i.e.,
max
i
min
j
mij ≤ V ∗ ≤min
j
max
i
mij .
Proof. Note that
max
u∈∆(A)
min
j
u>Mej = max
u∈∆(A)
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
u>Mϑ = V ∗ = min
ϑ∈∆(B)
max
u∈∆(A)
u>Mϑ = min
ϑ∈∆(B)
max
i
e>i Mϑ,
where ei denote the all-zero vector except a single 1 at element i, with proper dimensions. Also,
notice that
min
ϑ∈∆(B)
max
i
e>i Mϑ ≤minj maxi e
>
i Mej = minj
max
i
mij ,
where the inequality is due to that ei ∈ ∆(B) and the min on the right is taken over a smaller set,
thus has a larger value. This proves the right-hand side of the inequality. Proof for the other side is
analogous.
Lemma B.3 (-NE Strategy Interchangeability). Consider the game as above in Lemma B.2. Let
u1,u2 ∈ ∆(A) and ϑ1,ϑ2 ∈ ∆(B) be strategies such that (u1,ϑ1) is a Nash equilibrium strategy, and
(u2,ϑ2) is an -NE strategy. Then, both (u1,ϑ2) and (u2,ϑ1) are 2-NE strategy pairs.
Proof. Let V (u,ϑ) := u>Mϑ denote the value under any strategy pair (u,ϑ). By definition, we have
that for any u ∈ ∆(A) and ϑ ∈ ∆(B)
V (u,ϑ1) ≤ V (u1,ϑ1) ≤ V (u1,ϑ), V (u,ϑ2)−  ≤ V (u2,ϑ2) ≤ V (u2,ϑ) + .
Then, we have
V (u1,ϑ1) ≥ V (u2,ϑ1) ≥ V (u2,ϑ2)− , V (u1,ϑ1) ≤ V (u1,ϑ2) ≤ V (u2,ϑ2) + .
Combining the two, we have
V (u,ϑ2)− 2 ≤ V (u2,ϑ2)−  ≤ V (u1,ϑ1) ≤ V (u1,ϑ2) ≤ V (u2,ϑ2) +  ≤ V (u1,ϑ1) + 2 ≤ V (u1,ϑ) + 2
for any u ∈ ∆(A) and ϑ ∈ ∆(B), showing that (u1,ϑ2) is an 2-NE. The proof for the pair (u2,ϑ1) is
analogous.
42
